Updating and testing of a PWR model for the Modular Accident Analysis Programe MAAP5 by Marcos Delgado, Elisabet
Updating and testing of a PWR model for the Modular Accident Analysis Programe MAAP5 Page 1 
 
Abstract 
The present Master’s Thesis is part of the Master’s degree in Nuclear Engineering of the Universitat 
Politècnica de Catalunya and the ENDESA Escuela de Energía, and it was developed during the 
internship in a Spanish Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).   
The objective of the project is to update and test the nuclear plant model used for the Safety Analysis 
department which belongs to the Licensing Department mainly for Severe Accidents phenomenology 
studies to prepare for and respond to emergencies. 
The code used for this porpoises is the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP), actually 
developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). MAAP simulates the response of Light 
Water Reactors (LWR) during severe accidents; given a set of initiating events and operator actions, 
MAAP predicts the plant’s response as the accident progresses.  
The project includes a brief description of the severe accident phenomenology and an explanation of 
the MAAP code, including a summary of the reactor coolant primary system model, the containment 
systems and the Engineered Safeguards contemplated in the Reference Plant MAAP5 model. 
The latest version of the code that has been used to model the PWR Reference Plant is MAAP4.0.6 
and several accidents have been simulated for the Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Therefore, starting 
from the MAAP4.0.6 model of the PWR Reference Plant it has been developed the new MAAP5.0.1 
model, the so called Parameter File. Later on, the new model has been tested with the aim of gain 
confidence in the values of the Parameter File and hence, in the results of the accident sequences 
obtained with the new developed model.  
It has been test the new Reference Plant MAAP5.0.1 model by comparison against relievable results 
obtained with the RELAP5 code and the MAAP5 code. For the first case, it has been used the RELAP5 
model of the Reference Plant and for the second one, the well-validated reference PWR Parameter 
File of the ZION Nuclear Power Plant, which is delivered with the MAAP code. 
Afterwards, it’s shown the results of the testing calculations, which accommodates a brief description of 
each simulated accident followed by the plottable results. Finally, the conclusions of the project are 
presented. 
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1. Preface 
1.1. Project Origin 
The present Master’s Thesis is part of the Master’s degree in Nuclear Engineering of the Universitat 
Politècnica de Catalunya and the ENDESA Escuela de Energía, and it was developed during the 
internship in a Spanish Nuclear Power Plant.   
The objective of the project is to update and test the nuclear plant model used for the Safety Analysis 
department which belongs to the Licensing Department mainly for Severe Accidents phenomenology 
studies to prepare for and respond to emergencies. 
The code used for this porpoises is the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP), actually 
developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). MAAP simulates the response of LWR 
power plants during severe accidents; given a set of initiating events and operator actions, MAAP 
predicts the plant’s response as the accident progresses. 
The latest version of the code that has been used to model the Reference Plant is MAAP4.0.6 and 
several accidents have been simulated for the Probabilistic Risk Assessment.  
However, after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan, the Regulatory Body required 
the utilities to perform new safety related studies. The new capabilities of MAAP5.0.1will allow the utility 
to perform these calculations and therefore, it showed the necessity to update the model to the new 
version. 
1.2. Motivation 
Nuclear Safety is the principal aspect that concerns the operation of a nuclear power plant and it’s in 
this context where a reliable thermal-hydraulic model used for safety-related studies is crucial. 
Therefore, the new Regulatory Body requirements aren’t the unique motivation of the project; the new 
capabilities added to the new MAAP version code include an enhanced Best Estimate approximation 
that improves the behavior of the models. 
Starting from the MAAP4.0.6 model of the PWR Reference Plant and using the old Calculation Note, it 
has been developed the new MAAP5.0.1 model of the Reference Plant, the so called Parameter File. 
Later on, following the several recommended steps of the MAAP4 Application Guidance [1], the new 
model has been tested with the aim of gain confidence in the values of the Parameter File and hence, 
in the results of the accident sequences obtained with the new developed model.  
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2. Introduction 
2.1. Objectives 
The objectives of the project are updating a MAAP plant model from MAAP4.0.6 to MAAP5.0.1 for a 
PWR Reference Nuclear Power Plant and testing it by comparison against relievable results obtained 
with the RELAP5 Mod3.2 code and the MAAP5.0.1 code. For the first case, it’s used the RELAP5 
model of the Reference Plant and for the second case, the well-validated reference PWR Parameter 
File of the ZION Nuclear Power Plant, which is delivered with the MAAP code. 
2.2. Scope 
The project includes a brief description of the severe accident phenomenology and an explanation of 
the MAAP code, including a summary of the reactor coolant primary system model, the containment 
systems and the Engineered Safeguards contemplated in the Reference Plant MAAP5 model. 
With the aim of gain confidence with the new developed Parameter File, a comparison between the 
results obtained with the Reference Plant models of the MAAP5.0.1 code and RELAP5 code was 
made, in order to evaluate and adjust the model during the thermal-hydraulic phase of the accident, 
that is, before core damage. It has been analyzed seven accidents that were chosen to cover the major 
primary and secondary systems and different initiating events 
In absence of the MAAP5 Application Guidance, it has been detailed and met the recommendations of 
the MAAP4 Application Guidance [1], which includes: 
 Testing the Parameter File with a steady-state sequence. 
 Testing the Reference Plant model with three standard sequences to validate the file’s overall 
performance: a station blackout, a small LOCA, and a large LOCA. 
Afterwards, it’s shown the results of the testing calculations, which accommodates a brief description of 
each simulated accident followed by the plottable results. Finally, the conclusions of the project are 
presented. 
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3. Severe accident 
3.1. Definition 
Consideration of beyond design basis accidents at nuclear power plants is an essential component of 
the defence in depth approach used in ensuring nuclear safety. The probability of occurrence of a 
beyond design basis accident is very low, but such an accident may lead to significant consequences 
resulting from the degradation of nuclear fuel [2].  
A design basis accident is defined as accident conditions against which a facility is designed according 
to established design criteria, and for which the damage to the fuel and the release of radioactive 
material are kept within authorized limits. 
A beyond design basis accident comprises accident conditions more severe than a design basis 
accident, and may or may not involve core degradation. Accident conditions more severe than a design 
basis accident and involving significant core degradation are termed severe accidents.  
3.2. Accident phenomenology 
The types of phenomenological challenges that arise during a PWR severe accident can be identified 
for each of the fission product barriers. The descriptions of phenomena are intended to provide further 
insight related to the type of function that would be capable of stabilizing the accident and the distinct 
damage conditions at which recovery of a quasi-stable state could occur. The phenomena that 
challenge the fission product barriers include the following [3]: 
3.2.1. Fuel cladding 
Ballooning and rupture 
In low-pressure accident scenarios, when the core temperature reaches between 726 °C and 927 °C, 
this failure mode becomes possible. The time and temperature at which ballooning and rupture of the 
fuel cladding occurs depend on the internal pressure in the fuel rod relative to the external RCS 
pressure. In the case of high pressure sequences, the cladding will tend to collapse onto the fuel at 
much lower temperatures than those at which balloon rupture could occur. Although failure of the 
cladding in this manner will lead to release of fission products, there still exists a high probability of 
arresting the accident progression if cooling water is reintroduced. 
Over-temperature and oxidation 
During a severe accident, the exposure of fuel cladding to reduced cooling will lead to an escalation of 
cladding temperature. The rate at which the fuel and cladding will heat up will depend on the nature of 
the accident. For accidents with high heat-up rates, the temperature of the Zircaloy cladding can 
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escalate to its melting temperature, which would cause cladding failure and relocation. For accidents 
characterized by more gradual heat-up rates, which are typical in loss-of-heat-sink events, the 
temperature of the Zircaloy cladding will rise to about 1227 °C, at which point the rate of the exothermic 
interaction between Zircaloy and steam, generating hydrogen as a byproduct of the reaction, will begin 
to increase rapidly.  
This Zircaloy oxidation reaction will lead to a rapid escalation of fuel temperature. If not arrested, 
interactions between fuel, fuel cladding, and structural materials will lead to the formation of molten 
material at temperatures possibly below the individual melting points of the respective materials. Even 
after the start of oxidation of the fuel cladding, damage can be arrested by the restoration of cooling 
(sufficient to flood the uncovered fuel). 
3.2.2. Reactor coolant system 
Hot leg creep rupture 
If the core is uncovered for a significant period, natural circulation flows will be established between the 
core and the upper plenum, with additional natural circulation flows extending into the hot legs and the 
steam generator tubes. If creep rupture of a steam generator tube occurred, this would induce a 
bypass of containment. However, creep rupture of the hot leg or even the surge line could occur before 
an induced steam generator tube rupture.  
This challenge is of increasing relevance from the onset of significant fuel cladding oxidation through 
more extensive fuel damage. Actions that stabilize RCS temperatures, quenching damaged fuel and 
fuel debris, will be capable of mitigating this challenge. Actions that depressurize the primary system 
will also be capable of greatly reducing the rate of creep of these RCS components, depending on the 
extent of depressurization. Actions that lead to a rise in RCS pressure, such as restarting the main 
coolant pumps, could exacerbate this challenge. 
Overpressure 
This challenge is primarily related to situations in which water is injected into the RPV downcomer at a 
substantial rate. An example of an action that could cause such injection rates is the restart of an RCP 
in a PWR. For these situations, substantial pressurization could occur as the water interacts with the 
hot damaged fuel. Depending on the conditions in the RCS at the time of a RCP restart, there is the 
potential for the pressurization to challenge RCS integrity.  
3.2.3. Reactor pressure vessel 
Overpressure 
Under most operating and accident conditions, RPV overpressure does not pose a direct challenge to 
the structural integrity of the vessel. If high-pressure injection is inadvertently initiated at a time when 
the RCS has been cooled down, however, the overpressurizatoin of the vessel could promote a brittle 
fracture of the vessel. 
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In-vessel steam explosion 
The consequences of relocation of held-up molten fuel debris into the lower plenum has been 
extensively investigated. Of particular concern has been the potential for an in-vessel steam explosion 
to occur, which has been postulated in the past to lead to the failure of the upper head in such a way as 
to generate a missile that could impact and fail the containment. Consensus has developed that the 
likelihood of such an event is very small. The primary means of preventing the interaction between 
molten core debris and water in the lower plenum altogether is to restore cooling to the fuel before the 
fuel is significantly damaged.  
Molten jet attack 
In the absence of core cooling, core degradation will result in a large mass of debris forming on or 
above the lower core support plate. If cooling is not restored, this held-up molten debris will eventually 
relocate into the lower plenum. When molten material relocates into the lower plenum, there is the 
potential for debris jet contact with the lower head and some ablation of the lower head over the region 
of contact. However, water that is present in the lower plenum at the time of molten debris relocation 
out of the core region will tend to promote instability and fragmentation of the molten jet. This will 
greatly limit the extent of thermal attack of the lower head vessel wall. 
Creep failure of the lower head 
When molten corium has relocated into the lower head of the vessel, the thermal load on the lower 
head wall will escalate substantially, as internal convection within the molten pool draws approximately 
a quarter of the decay heat load out through the lower head wall in contact with debris. In addition to 
the thermal loading of the vessel wall, the vessel is subjected to mechanical loading from the dead 
weight of the core debris and the internal pressure of the vessel if the RPV has not been 
depressurized. The extent to which the lower head wall temperature will increase will depend on 
whether the cavity is flooded and the lower head is cooled externally by water.  
In addition, the heat flux from the molten pool will depend on the morphology of the debris bed in the 
lower head (that is, the potential for formation of metal layers that tend to promote high heat fluxes 
through limited regions of the vessel wall). If the lower head is not adequately cooled, creep failure of 
the lower head will eventually occur. The internal flooding of the vessel has the potential to minimize 
the thermal loading of the lower head wall. However, for higherpowered cores with a large mass of 
molten debris relocating into the lower head, the integrity cannot be guaranteed by this action alone. 
Additional strategies have been considered in which the cavity is flooded and the lower head is entirely 
submerged.  
Penetration failure 
The relocation of debris into the lower head of the RPV could also be accompanied by relocation of 
molten material into the numerous penetrations of the bottom head typically found in operating LWRs 
(the AP1000 has eliminated penetrations in the RPV lower head). Should molten material not freeze in 
the penetration, a melt-through of the penetration would be expected. If initial freezing does occur, the 
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penetration can still fail by melting if the debris remelts due to internal decay heat. Furthermore, if the 
RPV remains at high pressure with molten material in the lower head, the weakening of the penetration 
weld to the lower head could result in an ejection of the penetration from the lower head. The relocation 
of molten material through a failed penetration will tend to increase due to the ablation-assisted growth 
in the size of the failure area. This failure will result in vessel depressurization and relocation of debris 
into the cavity. As with other lower head failures, flooding of the vessel and the cavity could aid in 
limiting the extent of challenge to the integrity of penetrations. 
3.2.4. Containment building 
Core–concrete interaction 
The relocation of debris into direct contact with concrete has the potential to induce melting of the 
concrete. If the debris does not remain adequately quenched, the temperature at the interface with the 
concrete will escalate to the melting temperature of the concrete. Attack of the concrete structure will 
then begin, and the physicochemical processes associated with core–concrete interaction (CCI) will 
ensue. CCI tends to lead to the release of large quantities of hydrogen and carbon monoxide and 
promotes the release of less-volatile fission products into the containment. The occurrence of CCI will 
be influenced by the degree to which an overlying water pool can remove the heat generated within the 
debris bed. However, ensuring that the debris remains covered by water will serve to aid in scrubbing 
fission products released from the debris bed and, it will prevent direct radiative heat transfer from the 
surface of the debris bed into the containment atmosphere.  
Static overpressure 
The discharge of steam and noncondensable gases such as hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and carbon 
dioxide into containment will tend to increase the internal pressure of containment. Efforts to cool the 
overheated fuel can also lead to further steam generation at lower rates of cooling water addition to the 
core. If no action is taken to reduce the pressure, the static overpressure will eventually exceed the 
upper limit of the containment, and failure will occur. Such a failure could occur through a containment 
penetration or a gross failure of the structure. The rate at which the gases in containment will leak out 
depends on the size of the failure. Subsequent to this failure, containment will depressurize. The 
overpressure could be reduced by restoration of containment cooling (such as condensation of steam) 
or controlled venting.  
Over-temperature 
The release of steam and hot noncondensable gases such as hydrogen into the containment 
atmosphere will result in an escalation of the containment temperature. Furthermore, following core 
relocation into the reactor cavity, if the core is not covered by water, radiation from the hot surface of 
the debris will serve to radiatively heat the containment atmosphere. At sufficiently high temperatures, 
the containment will become susceptible to localized failures due to the degradation of, for example, 
penetration seals. As with reduction in containment static pressure, the restoration of containment 
cooling or controlled venting will reduce the temperature of containment. 
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Containment bypass/isolation 
Depending on the initiating event, the containment could be bypassed before the onset of core damage 
or as a consequence of events occurring during the progression of the accident. Initiating events such 
as interfacing system loss of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) or a steam generator tube rupture will provide 
a direct path for fission products to escape the primary containment. Events during the course of an 
accident, such as a consequential steam generator tube rupture, can induce containment bypasses. 
Alternatively, a path outside containment can develop if there is a failure in the containment isolation 
system. Potential means of minimizing the transport of fission products through breaches in the 
containment involve limiting the extent of overpressure in containment or flooding the location of the 
breach in either the primary or secondary containment. In addition, sprays provide a means of 
removing fission products from the atmosphere.  
Flammable gas combustion 
The oxidation of fuel cladding and other structural materials in the reactor will produce hydrogen. In 
addition, when CCI has initiated, hydrogen and carbon monoxide will be generated and released into 
the containment atmosphere. At sufficient concentrations of hydrogen and carbon monoxide—which 
depend on the relative proportion of hydrogen, carbon monoxide, steam, and oxygen in the mixture—
the containment atmosphere will become flammable. If a weak ignition source exists, such as a spark 
from electrical equipment or igniters, combustion of these flammable gases will begin. Depending on 
the concentration of flammable gases, highspeed flames could occur. In certain geometries, these 
high-speed flames could accelerate beyond the speed of sound to initiate an explosion. Such dynamic 
loads from fast or slow flames could induce structural failure of the containment. The challenge to 
structures from combustion events can be mitigated by measures to control the concentration of 
flammable gases in the containment atmosphere, such as the use of igniters or passive auto-catalytic 
recombiners. In addition, the introduction of nitrogen into containment atmospheres in sufficient 
quantities serves to inert the containment atmosphere.  
Ex-vessel steam explosion 
In the event that the reactor cavity contains water at the time of RPV lower head failure and corium 
relocation, an energetic interaction between molten debris and cavity water (that is, a steam explosion) 
may be possible. The occurrence of a steam explosion relies on rapid and sufficient fragmentation of 
molten debris to enhance the water-melt contact surface area and promote substantial heat transfer 
from the corium to the water. A shock wave could potentially result. The formation and propagation of a 
shock wave will mechanically load external structures. However, the occurrence of an ex-vessel steam 
explosion is by no means a certain occurrence. The fragmentation of molten debris upon entering the 
cavity water could also lead to strong quenching of debris and enhance the coolability of the debris in 
the reactor cavity. The occurrence of and energy released by an ex-vessel steam explosion will depend 
on the amount of water present in the reactor cavity. There is no direct means to mitigate an ex-vessel 
steam explosion, aside from preventing relocation of core debris outside the RPV. The evaluation of 
the benefit from flooding the reactor cavity in terms of long-term, in-vessel debris retention or even 
enhancing debris coolability through greater fragmentation must be weighed against the likelihood and 
consequences of a steam explosion. This type of evaluation is typically plant specific.  
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Direct containment heating 
If the RPV fail at high pressure, the discharge of molten corium and steam (referred to as a high-
pressure melt ejection) will result in complex flows of steam and corium within the reactor cavity. The 
consequence of such flows is strongly dependent on the geometry of the reactor cavity. Corium that is 
entrained by steam could be carried into regions of the containment connected to the reactor cavity. 
Furthermore, oxidation of corium by the steam will generate hydrogen. The transport of steam and 
corium into containment will induce pressurization and heating of the containment atmosphere. The 
extent of containment pressurization depends on the degree of core debris dispersal into containment. 
This issue has been resolved and is not considered, across the range of LWR designs, to pose a 
potential challenge to containment. 
Updating and testing of a PWR model for the Modular Accident Analysis Programe MAAP5 Page 23 
 
4. Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP)  
4.1. Introduction 
The Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) is an integral systems analysis code for assessing 
off-normal transients that can progress to and include severe accidents. It was initially developed 
during the industry-sponsored IDCOR Program. Ownership of MAAP was transferred to EPRI at the 
completion of IDCOR. Subsequently, the code evolved into a major analytical tool for supporting the 
plant-specific Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs) requested by NRC Generic Letter 88-20.[4]  
The first version of the code, MAAP3B, was developed early in 1980’s and it was updated to MAAP4 in 
the mid 1990’s. Periodically EPRI released subversions with improvements and new lessons learned. 
The last version of MAAP4 is MAAP4.0.8. In 2011 EPRI released MAAP5.0.1 which includes 
enhancements that will be explained in the following chapter.  
There are parallel versions of MAAP that support BWRs and PWRs and unique versions for Russian 
Federation pressurized light water reactor (VVER), Canadian-designed pressurized heavy water 
reactor (CANDU), and advanced thermal reactor (ATR) designs.  
These versions contain the same core model, containment model, fission product model, and input and 
output schemes. In addition, they have distinct primary system models and engineered safeguards 
(ESF) models. The code is applicable to both current and advanced LWR designs, with models that 
represent the passive features of the latter. 
MAAP simulates the response of LWR power plants during severe accidents. Given a set of initiating 
events and operator actions, MAAP predicts the plant’s response as the accident progresses. The 
code is used for the following: 
 To predict the timing of key events (for example, core uncovery, core damage, core relocation 
to the lower plenum, and vessel failure) 
 To evaluate the influence of mitigative systems and the impact of the timing of their operation 
 To evaluate the impact of operator actions 
 To predict the magnitude and timing of fission product releases 
 To investigate uncertainties in severe accident phenomena  
MAAP results are primarily used to determine level 2 PRA success criteria and accident timing to 
support human reliability analyses. MAAP considers the full spectrum of important phenomena that 
could occur during an accident, simultaneously modeling those that relate to the thermal-hydraulics and 
to the fission products. It also simultaneously models the primary system and the containment and 
reactor/auxiliary building. 
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MAAP treats steam formation, core heatup, cladding oxidation and hydrogen evolution, vessel failure, 
core debris-concrete interactions, ignition of combustible gases, fluid (water and core debris) 
entrainment by high velocity gases, and fission product release, transport, and deposition. MAAP treats 
all of the important engineered safety systems such as emergency core cooling, containment sprays, 
fan coolers, and power operated relief valves.  
In addition, MAAP allows operator interventions and incorporates these in a flexible manner, permitting 
the user to model operator behavior in a general way. Specifically, the user models the operator by 
specifying a set of variable values and/or events which are the operator intervention conditions 
combined with associated operator actions. Lastly, the auxiliary or reactor building can be modeled for 
sequences in which it is important. 
4.2. MAAP input and a output files 
MAAP requires two input files. The first is the parameter file, which contains plant-specific information, 
output specifications, and user-controlled phenomenological parameters. The second is the sequence 
input file, which specifies the accident initiators, operator actions, and sequence control times (end time 
and print interval). After processing the information in the two files, the code predicts the sequence of 
events and corresponding plant conditions. It generates a number of output files, including a synopsis 
of the sequence, a summary of events, tables of time-dependent results in a form suitable for plotting, 
and tabulated results that provide the details of the plant’s status at selected times. 
4.3. Reactor coolant primary system model 
The MAAP5 PWR primary system model calculates the thermal-hydraulic conditions in the RPV, the 
hot legs, the cold legs and the primary side of the steam generators (SGs). The pressurizer is treated in 
a separate model. The primary system is structured to evaluate the individual response of each coolant 
loop and the steam generator in that loop. The user specifies how many actual loops are and which 
loop contains the surge line to the pressurizer. 
Specifically, the common elements for those Westinghouse PWR designs, ranging from two-loop to 
four-loop designs, are: 
 One reactor coolant pump (RCP), one cold leg, one hot leg and one crossover leg from a 
steam generator to the RCP for each loop, 
 A reactor pressure vessel (RPV) downcomer, lower plenum, reactor core, reactor vessel upper 
plenum and the volume above the reactor vessel dome plate, and 
 One steam generator for loop. 
The PWR MAAP5 RCS models calculate the generation of steam and hydrogen gas in the core and 
the lower plenum, the overheating and possible melting of the fuel, clad and control components in the 
core, and mobile fission products in the core, the liberation, transport and deposition of fission products, 
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the possible relocation of core debris into the lower plenum, the thermal response of the molten debris 
in the lower plenum. 
It also calculates the release of hydrogen, steam, and water, to the containment, the release of core 
debris to the containment if the accident sequence leads to failure of the Reactor Pressure Vessel 
(RPV) lower head, local gas and structure temperatures in the RCS, heat losses from the RCS to 
containment and forced and natural circulation flows within the RCS. 
The pressurizer is modeled as a single control volume, with one water pool and one gas node. The 
water and gas can be at different temperatures (which are also distinct from the primary system fluid 
temperatures). Calculations of the thermal-hydraulic conditions in the pressurizer account for 
evaporation, condensation, steam stripping due to steam and non-condensable gases sparging 
through the water pool, and water and gas exchange with the primary system via the surge line and 
with the containment through relief and safety valves. Mass and energy contributions from pressurizer 
sprays and heaters and from heat transfer to structures are also included. 
The core model predicts the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the core and the water and gas contained 
within the core boundary along with the response of core components during all phases of a sequence. 
The calculations are performed on a nodal basis, typically 13 axial nodes (10 for the active core; 2 
below the active core for the core support plate, the lower tie plate, and lower gas plenum; and 1 above 
the active core for the upper tie plate and upper gas plenum) and 5 to 7 radial rings provide adequate 
resolution.  
The code tracks the mass, energy, and temperature of the following constituents in each PWR node: 
Fuel (UO2), cladding (Zr, ZrO2, stainless steel, and steel oxide), control rod or water rod (Ag-In-Cd or 
B4C, stainless steel, steel oxide, Zr, and ZrO2) and structural materials (Zr, ZrO2, stainless steel, and 
steel oxide). 
Input quantities include the initial masses of the different materials, the geometry of the constituents, 
and axial and radial peaking factors. The initial core power is specified by the user. Decay power can 
be determined by using the American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society 
(ANSI/ANS) decay heat power correlation or the user can specify the decay power as a function of time 
as an input table.  
4.4. Containment systems 
The MAAP containment model is an interconnection of compartments nodes and flow paths. Several 
compartments and flow junctions can be modeled in this way. The reference NPP containment is 
modeled as five compartments nodes and the auxiliary building is modeled as two compartments. 
Eleven junctions connect the different compartments among themselves and the environment. 
The containment regions have been conveniently selected and defined to coincide with physical 
partitions such as walls, gratings, etc. Flow junctions are based on openings such as stairwells, 
doorways, and gratings. 
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The following figure corresponds to the nodalization of the Containment and the Auxiliary Building of 
reference NPP model. 
 
Figure 4.1: Reference NPP Containment Nodalization. 
4.5. Engineered Safeguards Systems 
Consistent with the purposes of the MAAP code, it is necessary to model the important safety and 
other systems influencing the sequence of events occurring during applications ranging from short-
term, non-severe transients to long-term severe accidents. The safety systems include engineered 
safeguards systems (such as emergency core cooling systems and containment cooling systems) as 
well as control and standby systems which are actuated during accident transients. 
The reference NPP model includes the quench tank, the containment sprays, the auxiliary feedwater 
system, the low and high injection systems, fan coolers and relief valves of pressurizer and steam 
generators.  
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5. Updating plant model 
5.1. Introduction 
The latest version of the code that has been used to model the Reference Plant is MAAP4.0.6 and 
several accidents have been simulated for the Probabilistic Risk Assessment. However, after the 
Fukushima accident, the Regulatory Body required the utilities to perform new safety related 
calculations. The new capabilities of MAAP5.0.1 allow the utility to perform these calculations and 
therefore, it showed the necessity to update the model to the new version. 
5.2. Main differences between version codes 
The following differences between versions codes [5] are important to know in order to compare and 
evaluate the discrepancies that will be found when simulating the same scenarios with MAAP4.0.6 and 
MAAP5.0.1. 
Advanced Containment Model 
The first major development included in the MAAP5 version was the advanced containment modeling. 
The model has the following features: 
1. It models circulation of the containment gas space that is induced by the substantial 
momentum of the jet discharging from a break in the reactor coolant system. The initial 
circulation in the break compartment is mechanistically transferred to adjacent compartments. 
The circulation flow is in addition to pressure-driven and density-driven flows already in the 
previous MAAP4 model. 
2. Induced circulation significantly enhances forced convective heat transfer to structural heat 
sinks, which lowers peak pressures during large LOCA and main steam line break analysis. 
3. Induced circulation also results in entrainment of condensate from wall surfaces. The 
condensate is recirculated as water droplets into the freeboard gas space. The droplets act as 
a spray that virtually eliminates superheated temperatures caused by gas space compression. 
4. The model enhancements have been extensively benchmarked against a variety of small-
scale separate effects benchmarks and large-scale integral benchmarks. 
Advanced PWR RCS Model 
While the MAAP4 PWR RCS model was adequate for the original MAAP4 mission of supporting PRA 
and SAMG assessments, this model was not sufficient to cover the entirety of the broad scope of 
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applications necessary to support the addition of day-to-day engineering evaluations. Therefore, the 
MAAP5 model was given the following features. 
5. It models the individual performance of each coolant loop. Previously, MAAP4 was limited to 
two loops, and one- and two-phase water circulation was assumed identical in the two loops. 
The MAAP5 model demonstrates that, during asymmetric transients such as blowdown of only 
one steam generator loop, this loop has considerable circulation. However, in the other loops, 
circulation is stagnated by the absence of a thermal gradient, so these loops do not cooldown. 
6. The coolant loop models are fully mechanistic. This includes a fully-pose momentum equation 
that accommodates flow reversal in the event of a large transient, such as a large break or an 
asymmetric trip of reactor coolant pumps. It also includes a mechanistic phase separation 
(phase disengagement) model in each node. 
7. The coolant loop modeling also extends to the vessel, where the downcomer, lower plenum, 
core and upper plenum are each divided into quadrant nodes. Each quadrant node is 
connected azimuthally to the adjacent quadrant nodes and axially to the associated coolant 
loop. This nodalization accommodates pressure-driven flow and turbulent mixing that occurs 
between adjacent quadrant nodes during a large transient, such as a large break or an 
asymmetric trip of reactor coolant pumps. 
8. The MAAP4 model currently represents the response of the RPV lower head on relocation of 
molten core material into the lower plenum using five nodes through the RPV wall and five 
azimuthal nodes. These characterize the response of the lower head, specifically the 
temperature profile within the vessel carbon steel that is of key importance in representing the 
structural response (material creep) of the RPV lower head.  
To better represent the thermal response of the steel, in particular the potential for axial 
conduction in the azimuthal direction, this nodalization scheme is increased substantially. With 
this additional detail, the thermal conduction in this direction can be represented and thereby 
provide insights into the rate at which the lower head could be deformed under accident 
conditions. Such evaluations are important to the assessment of when the lower head could be 
expected to fail should such accident conditions be developed. 
9. The mechanistic water flow includes backflow through a fraction of steam generator tubes, 
which can occur during post-RCP trip natural circulation, thereby reducing steam generator 
heat transfer. The model also includes the potential for leakage flow from the hot leg to the 
downcomer across the hot leg boss on the core barrel. 
10. The two-region steam generator model from MAAP4 has been upgraded to accommodate the 
individual loop model. This includes benchmarking against the steam generator transients 
performed at the Westinghouse MB-2 large-scale test facility. 
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11. The MAAP5 model represents the boric acid precipitation within the core as well as the 
reverse process when hot leg injection is initiated for those conditions where global circulation 
through the loops cannot be established. 
12. The entire RCS model has been benchmarked against separate effects benchmarks, scaled 
integral benchmarks, and actual plant transients. 
5.3. MAAP5 basic plant model 
For helping users to prepare and update the Parameter File, MAAP code includes a Westinghouse 
four-loop reference plant model, the ZION5.par Parameter File, which contains the description of all 
necessary variables. Therefore, a comparison between the reference plant MAAP4.0.6 Parameter File 
and Zion MAAP5.0.1 Parameter File was done in order to evaluate which parameters were new, 
obsolete, modified or equal to the previous version.  
The Parameter File can be tested only when the file is essentially complete; that is, it is not possible to 
test individual components of the file such as the sections that relate to the primary system or the 
containment. For this reason, only the minimum variables and models required for running the updated 
MAAP5 Parameter File have been incorporated, in order to simplify the comparison of the results 
between code versions.  
5.4. Testing of Parameter File 
After the parameter file was created, it has to be tested before it is used for plant sequences. There are 
several recommended steps in this process to gain confidence in the values in the parameter file and 
hence in the results of their accident sequences [6]: 
5.4.1. Steady State sequence 
Testing the parameter file with a steady-state sequence is used to accomplish the following tasks. 
1. Check that the lines in the file can be read by the code (for example, screens for typographical 
errors or hidden formatting characters). 
2. Do a preliminary assessment of the initialization phase of a calculation and make adjustments 
to parameter values. 
3. Check that the parameter values are self-consistent. 
5.4.2. Visual review of the input lines 
The parameter file contains substantially more comment lines than lines actually processed by the 
code. A useful step in validating the entries in a file is to strip out the comment lines and then visually 
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inspect the remaining lines. Without the comment lines, it is easier to read the data lines and hence 
detect errors (for example, typographical errors or units mismatches). 
5.4.3. Test with several standard sequences 
It is recommended that the parameter file be tested with three standard sequences to validate the file’s 
overall performance: a station blackout, a small LOCA, and a large LOCA. 
First, each sequence should be run in order to solve any problems with the input and/or parameter file 
that may come out until the sequences run are completed. Then the results should be compared with 
the corresponding results from the sample sequences. The comparison consists of looking at the 
trends of the sequences as indicated by the key events and debris and fission product distributions in 
the figures-of-merit tables, system actuations as indicated by events in the summary files, and primary 
system and containment conditions shown in the plottable results.  
The mass and energy balances and the diagnostic message counts should also be checked, and any 
warning messages in the log files should be evaluated. Major differences between the test and sample 
sequences should be investigated. The differences may be the result of plant features. Other types of 
differences may indicate to the user areas in which their parameter file values could be refined. 
5.4.4. Test user-defined events 
All plant-specific user-defined events that have been included in the Userevt section of the parameter 
file should be tested. PWR users should also check that the events for creep rupture in the Userevt 
section have been modified to match the plant geometry, for example, the break elevations. 
Sequences should be devised that force the events to happen. The input files should contain logic or 
plot files that can be used to check the user-defined logic and the resultant actions.  
This is an important step and should not be skipped because it is easy to make mistakes when creating 
user-defined events. An iterative process is recommended to ensure that all potential errors or 
omissions have been addressed (for example, that units are correct, that the logic works as intended, 
and that deadbands and repeat statements are included as needed). 
5.4.5. MAAP5.0.1 versus MAAP4.0.6 code comparison 
It’s recommended to compare the results with MAAP5 and MAAP4 in order to validate the new model 
by explaining the differences between code’s versions. A Transmittal Document is delivered with each 
MAAP code version and it provides an executive summary of the notable modifications that were 
added in each code revision.  
5.4.6. MAAP5.0.1 versus RELAP5 comparison 
A comparison between the results obtained with MAAP5.0.1 code and RELAP5 code can be done in 
order to evaluate and adjust the model during the thermal-hydraulic phase of the accident, that is, 
before core damage. 
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RELAP5 MOD 3.2 has been widely used by the utility of the reference plant for simulating several 
accidents of the level 1 probabilistic risk assessment and therefore, the RELAP5 model has been 
tested and validated so that the comparison will add an extra confidence for the MAAP5.0.1 model. 
Page 32  Report 
 
 
 
Updating and testing of a PWR model for the Modular Accident Analysis Programe MAAP5 Page 33 
 
6. Testing the Parameter File 
6.1. MAAP5.0.1 vs RELAP5 MOD3.2 comparison 
The purpose of MAAP5 allows simplify the safeguards systems of their models. However, the control 
systems included in the RELAP5 model are quite complex and detailed and therefore they need to be 
explored in order to know the adjustments that have to be implemented in the MAAP5 model to obtain 
similar results between both codes. 
In order to gain confidence with the MAAP5.0.1 model of the Reference Plant, several accidents have 
been simulated with MAAP5.0.1 and they have been compared with the results of the Reference Plant 
RELAP5 model. The present chapter includes the results of the comparative analysis of five accidents 
that were chosen to cover the major primary and secondary systems and different initiating events. 
These are:  
 
1. Loss of heat sink 
2. Double-ended large break LOCA with unavailability of AFW 
3. Small LOCA with unavailability of AFW 
4. Steam generator tube rupture 
5. Station blackout 
Two more accidents were simulated for testing the new Parameter File and are presented in the Annex 
A due to their similarity of the previous scenarios. The simplicity of some MAAP aspects has concluded 
in certain limitations in the accident selection to adequately reproduce (according to the RELAP5 plant 
model) the control of some plant actuations. From the comparison of the results, significant conclusions 
of the MAAP5.0.1 thermal-hydraulic modeling capacity can be extracted.  
The following assumptions have been considered for all the cases: 
 MAAP assumes that MSIV closure, MFW termination and AFW actuation are initiated after 
certain delay time introduced by the user after the reactor scram. For the reference plant, the 
MSIV’s are closed 0.5 seconds after the scram hence the same actuation has been assumed 
in RELAP5. 
 The make-up and the letdown flows are not included in the MAAP5 model however they are 
considered in RELAP5 and therefore, they are stopped after the initiating event. 
 In contrast to RELAP5, the containment model in MAAP is modeled in detail and therefore, for 
all the simulations made with MAAP5, the four Fan Coolers are always available in order to 
cool the containment building and reduce its pressure, and the containment sprays are not 
available to have the same time to empty the water of the refueling water storage tank.  
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6.1.1. Plant model and steady state 
 
The new model was updated from the last MAAP4.0.6 Reference Plant model and the main sources of 
information are: the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints 
(PLS), primary and secondary system nodalization and the control implemented in the RELAP5 plant 
model, and the building, installations and systems schemes of the Reference Plant supplied by the 
utility. 
 
The following table shows the data obtained after simulating a steady state of 1000 seconds with 
MAAP5.0.1 and RELAP5 mod3.2 (null transient). 
 
PARAMETER RELAP5 mod3.2 MAAP5.0.1 
Primary system pressure 1.5517E7 Pa 1.5459E7 Pa 
Secondary system pressure 6.4744E6 Pa 6.4776E6 Pa 
Hot leg temperature 598.15 K 598.91 K 
Cold leg temperature 561.49 K 561.54 K 
Pressurizer water level 54.56 % 57.27 % 
Steam generator wide range level 81.60 % 81.73 % 
Nuclear power 2939.40 MW 2940.60 MW 
Primary to secondary heat transfer 2945.68 MW 2954.19 MW 
RCP’s power (3 pumps) 13.90 MW 13.89 MW 
Pressurizer heaters 0.68 MW 0 MW 
Letdown - Makeup + RCP’s seal flow (should be) 8.30 MW Not modeled 
Primary water inventory (without pzr) 177610.27 kg 175829.11 kg 
Primary system mass flow (one loop) 4650.36 kg/s 4657.21 kg/s 
Steam mass flow (one SG) 543.26 kg/s 546.45 kg/s 
MFW water temperature 500.41 K 500.37 K 
 
Table 7.1 – Steady State at nominal conditions for RELAP5 mod 3.2 and MAAP5.0.1 
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6.1.2. Loss of heat sink  
Accident conditions 
The initiating event, the loss of Main Feed Water (MFW), is produced after 50 seconds at nominal 
conditions. It’s postulated the unavailability of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) system, the 
accumulators and one train of High Pressure Injection (HPI) system. It’s also postulated the loss of 
Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) and the impossibility of its recovery.  
Taking into account the precautions of the Emergency Operation Procedure to response in front of a 
loss of heat sink, the plant recovery is manually started when the primary pressure is higher than 164 
kg/cm2 or 2/3 steam generator wide range levels (R.A) are less than 12%.  At this point, the Main 
Coolant Pumps are manually stopped and the feed and bleed maneuver is initiated using one train of 
HPI and one PORV of the pressurizer. 
The simulation is stopped after 10000 seconds, with the accident controlled and the temperatures 
decreasing. 
Accident description 
The loss of MFW produces in the Reference Plant a control signal to shut down the reactor in order to 
avoid the steam generator (SG) tubes to be discovered waiting for the low SG level scram signal. After 
the automatic shutdown, the nuclear power and the primary to secondary heat transfer decrease 
rapidly increasing the subcooled margin 30 ºC (see Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3).  
Because of the unavailability of the auxiliary feed water system, the steam generator relief valves play 
an important role on the primary to secondary heat transfer until the feed&bleed maneuver is initiated 
(see Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.10). 
The plant recovery started when the feed and bleed conditions are reached by stopping the MCP’s, 
manually opening the pressurizer relief valve and initiating the HPI (see Figure 6.6, Figure 6.8 and 
Figure 6.14). The objective of these actuations is to cool the core injecting water into the cold legs and 
bleeding through the pressurizer relief valve maintaining the primary water mass inventory (see Figure 
6.4). These actuations make the primary pressure decrease and the pressurizer water level increase 
(see Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.7). 
Since the Auxiliary Feed water system is not available, the steam generator level decreases until the 
feed&bleed is started (see Figure 6.9). The secondary pressure diminishes 4000 seconds after the 
scram, when the secondary started to heat the primary (see Figure 6.11). 
The accident is controlled 10000 seconds after the initiating event with the cold and hot leg 
temperatures decreasing (see Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13). 
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Adjustments 
The following figures show the evolution of the most significant variables for three different calculations: 
One with RELAP5, another with the MAAP5 base case and another with the MAAP5 modified case. 
The following adjustments have been introduced in the MAAP5 modified model in order to approximate 
its behavior to the RELAP5 calculation. 
The decay heat in MAAP5 is introduced by the user using a table depending on time after reactor 
shutdown. In RELAP5 the decay heat is calculated using the reactor kinetics of the cycle. Therefore, 
the residual power table has been adjusted in the MAAP5 modified case in order to coincide with the 
RELAP5 decay heat calculation. 
In MAAP5 there are two different methods to calculate the safety valve flow areas. The method 
used in the MAAP base model calculates the PORV’s flow area using the reference mass nominal 
flow rate at a given opening pressure introduced by the user. In the second method, which has 
been used in the MAAP5 modified model, the flow area and the discharge coefficient associated to 
the relief valve are introduced by the user. For the MAAP5 modified model it has been assumed 
the same flow area than in RELAP5 and it has been tested the discharge coefficient that best 
approximates the results, which is 0.8. The following figures show that the pressurizer relief model 
plays an important role in the primary water mass inventory and therefore, the primary pressure 
and temperatures.  
 
Since the initiating event is the loss of main feed water and the auxiliary feed water is not available, no 
further adjustments need to be made for the steam generator level. 
The feed and bleed conditions are reached approximately at 1340 s, 1440 s and 1640 s for MAAP5 
base model, MAAP5 modified model and RELAP5 respectively due to low level in two out of three 
steam generators. MAAP5 slightly anticipates the actuation since the primary to secondary heat 
transfer is higher and therefore, the water evaporation rate of the steam generator is faster. 
The simulation of this scenario allowed adjusting the behavior of the pressurizer relief valve model and 
improving the performance of the MAAP5 model, which is now capable to simulate significantly better 
the evolution of this accident. 
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Figure 6.1: Loss of FW – Nuclear Power 
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Figure 6.2: Loss of FW – Primary-secondary heat transfer 
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Figure 6.3: Loss of FW – Subccoled margin 
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Figure 6.4: Loss of FW –Primary water mass inventory 
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Figure 6.5: Loss of FW – Primary pressure 
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Figure 6.6: Loss of FW – High pressure injection system 
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Figure 6.7: Loss of FW – Pressurizer level 
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Figure 6.8: Loss of FW – Pressurizer relief valves flow 
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Figure 6.9: Loss of FW – Steam generator wide range level 
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Figure 6.10: Loss of FW – Steam generator relief mass flow 
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Figure 6.11: Loss of FW – Steam generator pressure 
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Figure 6.12: Loss of FW – Hot leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.13: Loss of FW – Cold leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.14: Loss of FW – Primary loop A flow 
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6.1.3. Double-ended large break LOCA with unavailability of AFW 
Accident conditions 
The initiating event, a double-ended large break LOCA in the cold leg A, is produced after 50 seconds 
at nominal conditions. It’s postulated the unavailability of one train of the Low Pressure Injection system 
(LPI), two out of three accumulators, one train of High Pressure Injection system (HPI) and the Auxiliary 
Feed Water system (AFW). The main coolant pumps are manually stopped when the subcooled 
margin is less than 5 ºC. 
The simulation is finished after 5000 seconds, just after the refueling water storage tank is emptied.  
Accident description 
The double-ended large break LOCA in the cold leg A depressurizes the primary system in few 
seconds. The reactor scramed due to low pressure in the pressurizer and rapidly two out of three 
accumulators discharged borated water into the cold legs of the primary system. The LPI system 
started and it was available to cool the core (see Figure 6.15, Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.21).   
The mass flow leaked just after the break is higher in MAAP5 and therefore, the safety system is 
capable to rapidly inject borated water during the first few seconds, what it’s traduced in a faster 
recovery of the water mass inventory of the primary circuit, higher RPV water level and higher 
subcooled margin. Due to the break mass flow oscillations, other thermal-hydraulics properties also 
fluctuate (see Figure 6.16, Figure 6.18, Figure 6.19 and Figure 6.22).  
The peak containment pressure reached after the large break LOCA in MAAP5 can’t be predicted by 
RELAP5, where the leakage is sent to a time dependent volume. In order to minimize the effect of the 
containment contra pressure on the LOCA mass flow and the thermal-hydraulics properties of the 
primary system, the fan coolers are connected in all MAAP5 simulations and consequently, the 
containment pressure falls exponentially with time. This behavior of the containment pressure is 
introduced in RELAP5 using a pressure versus time table constructed using the MAAP5 results. In this 
way, the evolution of the primary pressure and hot leg temperatures between both codes converged 
(see Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.25). 
Due to the loss of coolant, the primary to secondary heat transfer in RELAP5 becomes negative so that 
the secondary system heats the primary system reducing its pressure (see Figure 6.17).  
However, the heat transfer became positive for the first few minutes in MAAP5 after the primary 
depressurization and consequently the secondary pressure was increased. Once the primary to 
secondary heat transfer became negative, the SG pressure started to decrease. In MAAP5 it’s 
contemplated the SG heat losses through the containment environment and in consequence, the 
secondary depressurization is faster in MAAP5 than in RELAP5 (see Figure 6.17, Figure 6.23, and 
Figure 6.24).  
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The cold leg temperature of the cold leg A oscillates, in RELAP5 is due to the oscillations of the primary 
to secondary heat transfer while in MAAP5 is result of the fluctuations of the break mass flow (see 
Figure 6.17, Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.26). 
Adjustments 
The following figures show the evolution of the most significant variables for three different calculations: 
One with RELAP5, another with the MAAP5 base case and another with the MAAP5 modified case. 
The following adjustments have been introduced in the MAAP5 modified model in order to approximate 
its behavior to the RELAP5 calculation. 
The decay heat in MAAP5 is introduced by the user using a table depending on time after reactor 
shutdown. In RELAP5 the decay heat is calculated using the reactor kinetics of the cycle. Therefore, 
the residual power has been adjusted in the MAAP5 modified case in order to coincide with the 
RELAP5 decay heat. 
Different simulations changing the break discharge coefficient and the orientation of the break have 
been made in order to evaluate their effect on the thermal-hydraulics properties but no significant 
differences have been noted. The MAAP5 base model is appropriate to simulate a large break LOCA 
and to obtain good results. 
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Figure 6.15: Large break LOCA - Nuclear Power 
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Figure 6.16: Large break LOCA - Combined liquid and vapor break flow rate  
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Figure 6.17: Large break LOCA – Primary to Secondary heat transfer 
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Figure 6.18: Large break LOCA - Subcooled margin 
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Figure 6.19: Large break LOCA - Primary water mass inventory 
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Figure 6.20: Large break LOCA - Primary Pressure 
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Figure 6.21: Large break LOCA - Total safety injection mass flow 
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Figure 6.22: Large break LOCA - Vessel water level 
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Figure 6.23: Large break LOCA - Steam Generator Level A (R.A) 
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Figure 6.24: Large break LOCA - Steam Generator A Pressure 
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Figure 6.25: Large break LOCA - Hot leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.26: Large break LOCA - Cold leg A temperature 
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6.1.4. Small LOCA with unavailability of AFW 
Accident conditions 
The initiating event, a two-inch break LOCA in the cold leg A, is produced after 50 seconds at nominal 
conditions. It’s postulated the unavailability of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) system, the three 
accumulators, one train of High Pressure Injection (HPI) system and the Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) 
system. The main coolant pumps are manually stopped when the subcooled margin is less than 5 ºC. 
After the initialization of the HPI system, one pressurizer relief valve is manually opened to establish the 
coolant circulation through the core by injecting water into the cold legs and bleeding through the 
pressurizer. The simulation is finished after 22500 seconds, with the accident controlled and the 
temperatures decreasing. 
Accident description 
The two-inch break LOCA in the cold leg A depressurizes, in few seconds, the primary system until 
approximately 8.0E6 Pa where the pressure remains constant for some minutes and close to the 
secondary system pressure (see Figure 6.31).  
The reactor SCRAMed due to low pressure in the pressurizer at 89.2 s, 78.8 s and 71.7 s for the 
MAAP5 base model, MAAP5 modified model and RELAP5 model respectively (see Figure 6.27). The 
safety injection signal is activated at 93.7 s, 82.9 s and 79.2 s for the MAAP5 base model, MAAP5 
modified model and RELAP5 model respectively. At this point, one train of the HPI system started to 
inject borated water into the cold leg and the pressurizer relief valve was opened (see Figure 6.34 and 
Figure 6.37). 
The water mass inventory is lightly increasing from 5000 s to the end of the accident so that the flow 
coming in (HPI) is slightly greater than the flow coming out (the break flow and the pressurizer relief 
valve flow) (see Figure 6.30). 
The break mass flow is mainly composed by liquid until the U-tubes of the steam generator and the 
cold legs are emptied. At this time, vapor started to leak through the break and the primary to 
secondary heat transfer is inverted. In RELAP5 the break vapor flow lasts until 5000 seconds while 
MAAP5 estimates vapor leaking during all the simulation time (Figure 6.28, Figure 6.32 and Figure 
6.33). 
The primary system pressure was reduced from 8.0E6 Pa when vapor started to leak through the 
break. The HPI, the pressurizer relief flow and the two-inch break LOCA maintain the water level just 
below the hot leg elevation and the loop seals oscillated from block to unblock during the period 
between 1000 seconds to 1400 seconds in MAAP5. However, in RELAP5, there are two clear loop 
seal unblocking at 2500 seconds and 16000 seconds. The first one reduced the primary system 
pressure however; the second one incremented the core heat transfer by injecting water into the core 
and consequently, the primary pressure and hot leg temperature were increased (see Figure 6.31 and 
Figure 6.41). 
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The pump bowls blocking and the liquid and gas break mass flow rates impact the evolution of the 
primary system pressure between both codes. In RELAP5 the RCS pressure at the end of the 
simulation is equal to 8.1E5 Pa while in MAAP5 base model is equal to 33.7E5 Pa and in MAAP5 
modified model is equal to 23.7E5 (see Figure 6.31). 
The peak containment pressure reached after the 2” break LOCA in MAAP5 can’t be predicted by 
RELAP5, where the leakage is sent to a time dependent volume. In order to minimize the effect of the 
containment contra pressure on the LOCA mass flow and the thermal-hydraulics properties of the 
primary system, the fan coolers are connected in all MAAP5 simulations and consequently, the 
containment pressure falls exponentially with time. The quench tank rupture occurred in MAAP5 in less 
than ten minutes and the consequent discharge of mass and energy to the containment also increases 
its pressure. This behavior of the containment pressure is introduced in RELAP5 using a pressure 
versus time table constructed using the MAAP5 results. However, the primary system pressure and the 
hot leg temperature are greater in MAAP5 (see Figure 6.31 and Figure 6.41 ). 
The primary temperatures are decreasing after 22500 seconds. The MAAP5 hot leg temperature is 
higher than the RELAP5 temperature and its evolution is similar to the primary system pressure (see 
Figure 6.41). The evolution of the cold leg temperature is determined according to the fluid temperature 
and consequently, when the liquid is vaporized, the temperature is illusively changed. However, the 
cold leg temperature general trend in MAAP5 is slightly colder than in RELAP5 (see Figure 6.42). 
The vessel boiled-up water level is lower than the active core level. Once the pump bowl is unblocked, 
the water accumulated in the loop seal goes to the core increasing promptly the vessel water level. 
This effect is more notable in MAAP5 than in RELAP5. The higher temperature and pressure in 
MAAP5 allow a small positive subcooled margin. In RELAP5, it’s null and consequently the vessel 
water level in RELAP5 is generally lower than in MAAP5 (see Figure 6.29 and Figure 6.35). 
The pressurizer water level behavior differs notably between both codes. In MAAP5 the pressurizer is 
decreasing with the primary pressure until it is stabilized around 18 % however, in RELAP the level is 
maintained until the second loop seal unblocking (see Figure 6.36). The dome vessel bubble pushes 
the liquid water into the pressurizer and it can suddenly collapse into the hot leg if the RCS pressure is 
decreased. This water is injected into the core and therefore, the water vessel level and the subcooled 
margin are increased. Because of the MAAP5 higher primary pressure, the pressurizer relief valve flow 
is higher (see Figure 6.37). 
The steam generator relief valves are opened while the primary to secondary heat transfer is not null. 
Once the primary water level does not reach the U-tubes, the SG wide range level remains constant 
and the secondary pressure decreases; faster in MAAP5 because it also considers the SG heat losses 
to the environment; by transferring the heat to the primary circuit (see Figure 6.38, Figure 6.39 and 
Figure 6.40) 
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Adjustments 
The following figures show the evolution of the most significant variables for three different calculations: 
One with RELAP5, another with MAAP5 base case and another with MAAP5 modified case. The 
following adjustments have been introduced in the MAAP5 modified model in order to approximate its 
behavior to the RELAP5 calculation. 
The decay heat in MAAP5 is introduced by the user using a table depending on time after reactor 
shutdown. In RELAP5 the decay heat is calculated using the reactor kinetics of the cycle. Therefore, 
the residual power has been adjusted in the MAAP5 modified case in order to coincide with the 
RELAP5 decay heat.  
It has been tested again the same modified pressurizer PORV’s model used in the previous simulated 
accidents (same flow area than in RELAP5 and discharge coefficient equal to 0.8) in order to evaluate 
the convenience of using this method for the pressurizer relief valve flow areas calculation. Although 
the pressurizer relief model does not play the important role on the primary water mass inventory, 
primary pressure and temperatures that showed before, it’s still improving the evolution of the accident. 
Again it’s confirmed the better behavior of the new PORV’s model. 
As we have seen, MAAP assumes MFW termination certain delay time after the reactor scram that it’s 
introduced by the user. The steam generator main feed water coast down time is assumed to be zero. 
With the aim of adjust the steam generator level, it has been modified the signal delay time for main 
feedwater isolation, which is defined in MAAP5 as the delay from the receipt of signal (reactor scram) 
until actual isolation. For the MAAP5 base model this time is 3.0 seconds. However, in RELAP5 the 
isolation of the MFW valves is controlled by the average primary temperatures. In order to match the 
steam generator level of the MAAP5 modified case to the RELAP5 calculation, the delay time has been 
extended to 7.5 seconds, the same delay calculated by RELAP5. 
By default, the discharge coefficient of the break is assumed to be 0.75. Different simulations changing 
the break discharge coefficient have been made in order to evaluate its effect on the thermal-hydraulics 
properties. The best approximation is reached with the discharge coefficient set to 1. 
Break area sensibilities showed no significant reduction of the primary pressure. 
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Figure 6.27: Small break LOCA – Nuclear power 
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Figure 6.28: Small break LOCA – Primary to secondary heat transfer 
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Figure 6.29: Small break LOCA – Subcooled margin 
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Figure 6.30: Small break LOCA – Primary water mass inventory 
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Figure 6.31: Small break LOCA – Primary pressure 
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Figure 6.32: Small break LOCA – Break liquid mass flow 
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Figure 6.33: Small break LOCA – Break vapor mass flow 
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Figure 6.34: Small break LOCA – High pressure injection mass flow 
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Figure 6.35: Small break LOCA – Vessel water level 
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Figure 6.36: Small break LOCA – Pressurizer level 
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Figure 6.37: Small break LOCA – Pressurizer relief valve flow 
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Figure 6.38: Small break LOCA – Steam generator wide range level 
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Figure 6.39: Small break LOCA – Steam generator A relief valve mass flow 
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Figure 6.40: Small break LOCA – Steam generator A pressure 
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Figure 6.41: Small break LOCA – Hot leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.42: Small break LOCA – Cold leg A temperature 
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6.1.5. Steam generator tube rupture 
Accident conditions 
The initiating event, a double guillotine steam generator B tube rupture, is produced after 50 seconds at 
nominal conditions followed by the main steam isolation valves closure. It’s postulated the unavailability 
of one train of High Pressure Injection system, the AFW motor driven pump B and the AFW turbo 
driven pump. 
The AFW motor driven pump A will feed the steam generator A. At time 1850 seconds, the steam 
generators B and C are isolated and one pressurizer relief valve is manually opened in order to reduce 
the pressure of the steam generator B and the break mass flow. The steam generator A relief valve is 
manually controlled from 1850 seconds to the end of the simulation to avoid a maximum cooling 
greater than 55 ºC in any period of one hour. The main coolant pumps are working during all the 
accident. 
The simulation is finished after 10000 seconds, with the accident controlled and the temperatures 
decreasing. 
Accident description 
The main steam isolation valves closure vaporizes the steam generator water and consequently, in 
MAAP5.0.1, the water level falls below the steam generator water level setpoint for low level reactor trip 
in just 2.6 seconds. In RELAP5, the SG level didn’t fall below this setpoint and the scram is produced 
after 9.5 seconds due to OTDT (see Figure 6.43 and Figure 6.52).  
The MFW is isolated few seconds after reactor scram and the AFW motor driven pump A is started to 
inject water only into the SG A. MAAP models the start of the AFW system as a step function; that is, 
after the reactor scram, MAAP waits for expiration of the delay time specified by the variable TDAFW, 
after which the AFW flow is enabled. In accordance with the AFW system specifications it should be 
initiated if there is Safety Injection signal, low level in any SG, MFW turbo driven pumps shut off, 
AMSAC actuation or low voltage in the MCP lines. The AFW control of the RELAP5 PWR model is 
accordingly simulated to these requirements and this discrepancy is the source of the different SG 
water level behavior. 
The AFW mass flow is regulated to maintain the steam generator water wide range level around 80%. 
The RELAP5 water level control is quite simple; the AFW valve is opened if the water level is between 
78% and 83% and therefore, the AFW mass flow is not constant (see Figure 6.52 and Figure 
6.58).This control makes oscillate the SG water level and therefore, the relief and safety valves mass 
flow and the primary to secondary heat transfer fluctuate (see Figure 6.44 and Figure 6.55). 
The steam generator tube rupture depressurizes the primary system until the safety injection signal is 
activated, at 290.2 s, 478.4 s and 480.0 s for the MAAP5 base model, MAAP5 modified model and 
RELAP5 model respectively. At this point, one train of the HPI system started to inject borated water 
into the cold leg (see Figure 6.47 and Figure 6.49). 
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The relief and safety valves of the steam generators are automatically opened after MSIV’s closure 
with the aim of avoiding the over pressure of the secondary system. After 1850 seconds, the SG B 
relief and safety valves are manually closed in order to isolate the broken SG. The relief valve of the 
steam generator A is manually controlled to cool the primary system preventing a maximum cooling 
greater than 55 ºC in any period of one hour and the relief valve of the SG C is manually closed due to 
MAAP input options (see Figure 6.55, Figure 6.56 and Figure 6.57).  
The PORV opening reduces the primary pressure and consequently the secondary pressure 
decreases (see Figure 6.59, Figure 6.60 and Figure 6.61). The break mass flow direction is inverted for 
few seconds due to the pressure mismatch between primary and secondary systems and therefore, 
some SG B liquid water returned into the RCS (see Figure 6.48).  
Notice that in MAAP5, the SG B pressure is not reduced below the RCS pressure while it is reduced in 
RELAP5. This is consequence of the faster depressurization of the steam generators B and C 
calculated by RELAP5 (see Figure 6.60). 
In order to avoid the steam generator B relief valves opening and attempting to minimize the break 
mass flow, the primary system pressure is reduced until 7.5E6 Pa by manually opening the pressurizer 
relief valve at 1850 seconds. Accordingly to the RCS rapid depressurization, the subcooled margin is 
reduced for few minutes and the boiled-up vessel water level is decreased below the active core 
elevation (see Figure 6.45 and Figure 6.64).  
After the PORV opening, the pressurizer became solid and the water mass flow relieved through the 
PORV calculated by RELAP5 made nonphysical oscillations so even reducing the time step (see 
Figure 6.50 and Figure 6.51). 
The PORV opening held back the RCS mass flow of all loops for few minutes except for the loop A in 
RELAP5 (see Figure 6.65 and Figure 6.66). The primary water mass inventory is also reduced after the 
PORV opening until the HPI mass flow is able to compensate the water leaked (see Figure 6.46). 
The hot and cold leg temperatures decreased after the SG A relief valve and the pressurizer PORV 
opening (see Figure 6.65 and Figure 6.66).  
Adjustments 
The following figures show the evolution of the most significant variables for three different calculations: 
One with RELAP5, another with MAAP5 base case and another with MAAP5 modified case. The 
following adjustments have been introduced in the MAAP5 modified model in order to approximate its 
behavior to the RELAP5 calculation. 
The decay heat in MAAP5 is introduced by the user using a table depending on time after reactor 
shutdown. In RELAP5 the decay heat is calculated using the reactor kinetics of the cycle. Therefore, 
the residual power has been adjusted in the MAAP5 modified case in order to coincide with the 
RELAP5 decay heat.  
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It has been tested again the same modified pressurizer PORV’s model used in the previous simulated 
accidents (same flow area than in RELAP5 and discharge coefficient equal to 0.8) in order to evaluate 
the convenience of using this method for the pressurizer relief valve flow areas calculation. Although 
the pressurizer relief model does not play the important role on the primary water mass inventory, 
primary pressure and temperatures that showed before, it’s still improving the evolution of the accident. 
Again it’s confirmed the better behavior of the new PORV’s model. 
As we have seen, MAAP assumes MFW termination certain delay time after the reactor scram that it’s 
introduced by the user. The steam generator main feed water coast down time is assumed to be zero. 
With the aim of adjust the steam generator level, it has been modified the delay time signal for the main 
feedwater isolation, which is defined in MAAP5 as the delay from the receipt of signal (reactor scram) 
until actual isolation. For the MAAP5 base model this time is 3.0 seconds. However, in RELAP5 the 
isolation of the MFW valves is controlled by the average primary temperatures. Tempting to match the 
steam generator level of the MAAP5 modified case to the RELAP5 calculation, the MFW system was 
kept after scram until t=97.5 seconds, the same delay time calculated by RELAP5. 
By default, the discharge coefficient of the break is assumed to be 0.75. Different simulations changing 
the break discharge coefficient have been made in order to evaluate its effect on the thermal-hydraulics 
properties. The best approximation is reached with the discharge coefficient set to 0.45. 
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Figure 6.43: Steam generator tube rupture – Nuclear power 
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Figure 6.44: Steam generator tube rupture – Primary to secondary heat transfer 
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Figure 6.45: Steam generator tube rupture – Subcooled margin 
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Figure 6.46: Steam generator tube rupture – Primary water inventory 
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Figure 6.47: Steam generator tube rupture – Primary system pressure 
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Figure 6.48: Steam generator tube rupture – Liquid break mass flow 
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Figure 6.49: Steam generator tube rupture – HPI mass flow 
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Figure 6.50: Steam generator tube rupture – Pressurizer water level 
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Figure 6.51: Steam generator tube rupture – PORV combined water and vapor flow 
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Figure 6.52: Steam generator tube rupture – Steam generator A water wide range level 
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Figure 6.53: Steam generator tube rupture – Steam generator B water wide range level 
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Figure 6.54: Steam generator tube rupture – Steam generator C water wide range level 
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Figure 6.55: Steam generator tube rupture – SG A relief and safety valves mass flow 
 
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Time (s)
(k
g/
s)
RELAP5 MAAP5 Base MAAP5 Modified
STEAM GENERATOR B RELIEF&SAFETY VALVES FLOW
 
Figure 6.56: Steam generator tube rupture – SG B relief and safety valves mass flow 
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Figure 6.57: Steam generator tube rupture – SG C relief and safety valves mass flow 
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Figure 6.58: Steam generator tube rupture – AFW mass flow entering SG A 
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Figure 6.59: Steam generator tube rupture – Steam generator A pressure 
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Figure 6.60: Steam generator tube rupture – Steam generator B pressure 
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Figure 6.61: Steam generator tube rupture – Steam generator C pressure 
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Figure 6.62: Steam generator tube rupture – Hot leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.63: Steam generator tube rupture – Cold leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.64: Steam generator tube rupture – Boiled-up vessel water level 
Updating and testing of a PWR model for the Modular Accident Analysis Programe MAAP5 Page 77 
 
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Time (s)
(k
g/
s)
RELAP5 MAAP5 Base MAAP5 Modified
PRIMARY LOOP A FLOW
 
Figure 6.65: Steam generator tube rupture – Primary loop A mass flow 
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Figure 6.66: Steam generator tube rupture – Primary loop B mass flow 
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6.1.6. Station Blackout 
Accident conditions 
The initiating event, a station blackout, is produced after 50 seconds at nominal conditions. It’s 
postulated the unavailability of the AFW turbine driven pump and the MFW isolation just after the 
reactor trip. Although the actual and RELAP5 MFW isolation is produced after the SCRAM when the 
average primary temperatures are lower than 568.15 K, is postulated the MFW isolation just after the 
scram with the aim of matching the RELAP5 and MAAP5 behavior of the steam generator level. 
Due to the loss of AC power, the control rods are de-energized and the reactor is SCRAMed, the main 
coolant pumps and MFW motor driven pumps are tripped and the Safety Injection system (except the 
accumulators), the pressurizer’s heaters and pressurizer’s sprays are not available. 
It’s assumed the loss of coolant through the MCP seals just after the loss of AC power; first the leakage 
rate is 1.3 liters per second and after 10 minutes, 30 liters per second. 
It’s postulated the loss of DC power two hours after the station blackout thus, from this point, the steam 
generator and pressurizer’s PORVs won’t be available. 
The simulation is finished at 6380 seconds, when core damage is produced in RELAP5 and before the 
loss of DC power. 
Accident description 
After the loss of AC power, the reactor is tripped due to the de-energization of the control rods thus, the 
nuclear power and the primary to secondary heat transfer decrease rapidly (see Figure 6.67 and Figure 
6.68).  
The mass flow rate of the primary system is rapidly decreased after the MCPs shutdown to a greater 
extent in MAAP5 than in RELAP5 and in consequence, in MAAP5, the primary to secondary heat 
transfer is decreased faster after the loss of AC power and oscillated once. The heat transfer is not 
similar between codes until the primary mass flow is almost matched (see Figure 6.82 and Figure 
6.68). The lower heat transfer in MAAP5 reduces more the subcooled margin since the hot leg 
temperature is higher and the primary pressure is lower than in RELAP5 (see Figure 6.69, Figure 6.71 
and Figure 6.79). 
The secondary pressure increases after the reactor trip faster in MAAP5 than in RELAP5 and it’s 
almost constant during all the simulation. Because of the unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
system, the steam generator relief valves play an important role on the primary to secondary heat 
transfer until the steam generator and the primary system are emptied (see Figure 6.70, Figure 6.76, 
Figure 6.77and Figure 6.78). 
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Since the AFW system is not available and the MFW system is tripped after reactor shutdown, the 
steam generator level decreases during all the accident and they are emptied approximately 45 
minutes after the loss of AC power (see Figure 6.76). 
The pump seal failure depressurizes the primary system at 1.3 liters per second during the first 10 
minutes and then, at 30 liters per second (see Figure 6.72). The primary pressure is always over the 
accumulator’s pressure and therefore, there’s no safety injection entering the primary system. The 
water natural circulation is stopped due to the reduction of the water mass inventory and in 
consequence, the primary pressure, the cold temperature and the pressuriser water level started to 
increase (see Figure 6.71, Figure 6.80 and Figure 6.74). In MAAP5, the pressurizer’s relief valves were 
automatically opened to reduce the RCS pressure but not in RELAP5 (see Figure 6.75). The loss of 
coolant reduced the vessel water level and the core was uncovered (see Figure 6.73).  
The simulation is finished after core damage in RELAP5, that is, when the core is uncovered and the 
cladding temperature is higher than 1350 K (see Figure 6.81). 
Adjustments 
The following figures show the evolution of the most significant variables for three different calculations: 
One with RELAP5, another with MAAP5 base case and another with MAAP5 modified case. The 
following adjustments have been introduced in the MAAP5 modified model in order to approximate its 
behavior to the RELAP5 calculation. 
The decay heat in MAAP5 is introduced by the user using a table depending on time after reactor 
shutdown. In RELAP5 the decay heat is calculated using the reactor kinetics of the cycle. Therefore, 
the residual power table has been adjusted in the MAAP5 modified case in order to coincide with the 
RELAP5 decay heat calculation. 
In MAAP5 there are two different methods to calculate the safety valve flow areas. The method used in 
the MAAP base model calculates the PORV’s flow area using the reference mass nominal flow rate at 
a given opening pressure introduced by the user. In the second method, which has been used in the 
MAAP5 modified model, the flow area and the discharge coefficient associated to the relief valve are 
introduced by the user.  
It has been tested again the same modified pressurizer PORV’s model used in the previous simulated 
accidents (same flow area than in RELAP5 and discharge coefficient equal to 0.8) in order to evaluate 
the convenience of using this method for the pressurizer relief valve flow areas calculation. Although 
the pressurizer relief model does not play the important role on the primary water mass inventory, 
primary pressure and temperatures that showed before, it’s still improving the evolution of the accident. 
Again it’s confirmed the better behavior of the new PORV’s model. 
The actual and RELAP5 MFW isolation is produced after the reactor trip, when the average primary 
temperatures are lower than 568.15 K. For this accident in RELAP5, the MFW is not isolated until 103 
seconds after reactor shutdown and during this period, the MFW mass flow is regulated according to 
the vapor mass flow leaving out the steam generator. This control is simplified in MAAP5, where the 
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MFW isolation is produced after a delay time introduced by the user or there is the option of keeping 
the MFW after reactor scram. Due to the impossibility to simulate the same MFW mass flow for both 
codes and in order to march the RELAP5 and MAAP5 behavior of the steam generator level, it’s 
postulated the MFW isolation just after the reactor scram. 
By default, the discharge coefficients of the breaks are assumed to be 0.75. Different simulations 
changing the break discharge coefficients have been made in order to evaluate the effect on the 
thermal-hydraulics properties. The best approximation is reached with the discharge coefficients of 
each break (each loop) set to 1.0. 
The steam generator A level is emptied at time equal to 2940 s, 2360 s and 2550 s for RELAP5, 
MAAP5 base model and MAAP5 modified model respectively. The core is uncovered earlier in 
RELAP5 and therefore the core damage (hot cladding temperature equal to 1350 K) is also reached 
earlier in RELAP5 than in MAAP5. 
The simplicity of this accident allows observing the different behavior of both codes in front of the 
natural circulation phenomena and how it modifies the timing of the steam generator and vessel dry-
outs. Although there are some differences in the evolution between both codes, it’s possible to say that 
MAAP5 foresees quite well the behavior of the thermal-hydraulic properties after a station blackout 
without AFW. 
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Figure 6.67 – Station Blackout – Nuclear power 
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Figure 6.68 – Station Blackout – Primary to secondary heat transfer 
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Figure 6.69 – Station Blackout – Subcooled margin 
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Figure 6.70 – Station Blackout – Primary water inventory 
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Figure 6.71 – Station Blackout – Primary system pressure 
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Figure 6.72 – Station Blackout – Combined liquid and vapor break mass flow seal A 
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Figure 6.73 – Station Blackout – Vessel water level 
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Figure 6.74 – Station Blackout – Pressurizer water level 
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Figure 6.75 – Station Blackout – Pressurizer relief valves mass flow 
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Figure 6.76 – Station Blackout – SG wade range level 
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Figure 6.77 – Station Blackout – SG and SV relief valves mass flow 
 
STATION BLACKOUT - PUMP SEAL LOCA
6.0E+06
6.5E+06
7.0E+06
7.5E+06
8.0E+06
8.5E+06
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Time (s)
(P
a)
RELAP5 MAAP5 Base MAAP5 Modified
STEAM GENERATOR A PRESSURE
 
Figure 6.78 – Station Blackout – SG A pressure 
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Figure 6.79 – Station Blackout – Hot leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.80 – Station Blackout – Cold leg A temperature 
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Figure 6.81 – Station Blackout – Cladding temperatura and máximum core temperature 
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Figure 6.82 – Station Blackout – Primary loop A mass flow 
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6.1.7. Conclusions of RELAP5 vs MAAP5 comparison 
 
The simplicity of the MAAP5.0.1 control for simulating the feedwater and steam dump behavior has 
limited the accident selection however; the MAAP containment is modeled in detail while it isn’t in the 
RELAP5 one and in consequence, the MAAP pressure evolution is introduced in the RELAP5 model 
to simulate the containment peak pressures after mass and energies releases. 
 
The main detected differences between both codes are: 
 
 The MFW isolation is produced after a certain delay time in MAAP5 however, in the RELAP5 
model, the isolation time depends on the primary average temperatures and therefore, it is 
function of the accident simulated. 
 
 The steam needed to feed the AFW turbine driven pump is not considered in the MAAP5.0.1 
model while it is taken into account, and it is extracted from the SG B and C, in the RELAP5 
model.  
 
 The AFW mass flow control, which regulates the steam generator wide range levels around 
80%, is simple and discrete in the RELAP5 model. Thereupon it introduces some oscillations 
in the primary to secondary heat transfer however; the SG level control in MAAP5 is able to 
stabilize the level around 80% without introducing so many fluctuations. This different control 
modifies the behavior of the plant between both codes. 
 
 The steam dump is not considered in the MAAP5 model and the MSIVs are closed 0.5 
seconds after reactor trip.  The same actuation is imposed in RELAP5 in all the simulated 
accidents. 
 
 In contrast to RELAP5, the containment model in MAAP is modeled in detail and therefore, for 
all the simulations made with MAAP5, the four Fan Coolers are available in order to cool the 
containment building and reduce its pressure. In the RELAP5 model, the containment is 
considered as a time dependent volume and it can’t predict peak pressures after large amount 
of mass and energy releases to the containment building. In consequence, the containment 
pressure is introduced according to the MAAP5 containment pressure evolution in order to 
converging temperatures and pressures of the primary system between both codes and 
models. 
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 In RELAP5 is not possible to simulate the recirculation period after the refueling water storage 
tank empting and in consequence, the containment sprays are not available in the MAAP5 
simulation in order to match the time to empty the water of the RWST.  
Taking into account the previous limitations of both codes, seven accidents were selected and 
simulated from which good results were obtained and they showed the need to adjust some MAAP5 
model aspects. 
The adjustments performed that can be introduced permanently in the MAAP5 model are: 
 
 As we have seen, in MAAP5 there are two different methods to calculate the safety valve flow 
areas. The method used in the MAAP base model calculates the pressurizer PORV’s flow 
area using the reference mass nominal flow rate at a given opening pressure introduced by the 
user. In the second method, which has been used in the MAAP5 modified model, the flow area 
and the discharge coefficient associated to the relief valve are introduced by the user.  
It has been tested the same modified pressurizer PORV’s model in all the simulated accidents 
(same flow area than in RELAP5 and discharge coefficient equal to 0.8) in order to evaluate 
the convenience of using this method for the pressurizer relief valve flow areas calculation.  
The new PORV’s flow area calculation allows simulating significantly better the evolution of the 
transients where the pressurizer’s PORVs need to be opened and therefore, it’s proposed to 
change its model. 
 
 By default in MAAP5, the discharge coefficients of the primary breaks are assumed to be 0.75. 
Different simulations changing the break discharge coefficient have been made in all LOCA 
transients in order to evaluate its effect on the thermal-hydraulics properties. The best 
approximation to RELAP5 is reached for all the cold leg LOCA accidents with the discharge 
coefficient set to 1. For the steam generator tube rupture scenario, the best approximation is 
reached with the discharge coefficient equal to 0.45. It’s proposed to change the default 
discharge coefficients. 
 
The comparative analysis between MAAP5.0.1 and RELAP5 Mod3.2 calculations has showed the 
limitations of the Reference Plant MAAP5 model to simulate some accidents of the level 1 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment. However, it allowed testing the Reference NPP MAAP5.0.1 model in 
front of the thermal-hydraulic phase of the severe accidents and justifying its behavior in front of 
different initiating events.  
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6.2. Reference plant vs Zion comparison with MAAP5.0.1 
According to the MAAP4 Applications Guidance [1], it is recommended that the parameter file be tested 
with three standard sequences to validate the file’s overall performance: a Station Blackout, a small 
LOCA, and a large LOCA.  
Meeting the recommendations, a comparison between the results of the sample sequences obtained 
with the Reference Plant MAAP5.0.1 model and the Zion MAAP5.0.1 model has been done in order to 
test and validate the new plant model for Reference Plant I-II NPP. 
 
The present chapter includes the results of the comparative analysis using the three PWR Large Dry 
Plant standard sequences that are delivered with the MAAP5.0.1 code. These are:  
 
1. LBLOCA: A double-ended cold LOCA with failure of recirculation 
2. SBLOCA: A 2” break at bottom of horizontal cold leg with failure of recirculation 
3. Station blackout with pump seal LOCA 
 
While not completely exhaustive in terms of exercising every single line of the code, these sequences 
do an adequate job of exercising all major models and confronting those models with a variety of 
anticipated boundary conditions. These sequences also enable/disable various operator actions and 
system actuations. In so doing, these sequences provide the broadest general evaluation of the code 
in the most productive manner possible. 
6.2.1. Plant model and steady state 
 
The new Reference Plant model is updated from the last MAAP4.0.6 Reference Plant model and the 
main sources of information are: the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the Precautions, 
Limitations and Setpoints (PLS) and the building, installations and systems schemes of the Reference 
Plant supplied by the Utility. 
 
The Reference Plant and Zion NPP are Westinghouse PWR Large Dry Plants. The main difference is 
the thermal power and hence, the number of loops in each plant. The Reference Plant has 3 loops 
while Zion is a four-loop plant. Another significant difference is the reactor cavity compartment size 
and the orientation and area of the junctions that connect this compartment with the other ones. 
Zion’s cavity is smaller than Reference Plant’s cavity and the disposition of its junctions may flood the 
reactor cavity and cool externally the reactor vessel. This phenomenon is not possible in the 
Reference Plant. 
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In the following Table 6.1 are summarized the cavity’s compartment features of the models. 
 
Cavity Compartment ZION model Reference Plant model 
Volume 217.0 m3 407.5 m3 
Elevation relative to ground floor -10.0 m -22.55 m 
Height 11.0 m 14.835 m 
Table 6.1 – Cavity’s compartment features of the Reference Plant and Zion MAAP5.0.1 models 
 
In the following Table 6.2 are summarized the cavity compartment’s junctions features of the models. 
 
Model 
Junction 
Number 
Junction 
Orientation 
Upstream 
compartment 
Downstream 
compartment 
Junction 
Area (m2) 
ZION 
1 Horizontal Cavity Comp. Lower Comp. 0.500 
2 Vertical Cavity Comp. Lower Comp. 5.920 
Reference 
Plant 
1 Horizontal Coolers Comp. Cavity Comp. 4.534 
5 Vertical Cavity Comp. Upper Comp. 0.762 
8 Horizontal Cavity Comp. Lower Comp. 1.479 
Table 6.2 – Cavity compartment’s junctions features of the Reference Plant and Zion MAAP5 models 
 
Other differences between models are summarized in the following tables and they will be explained 
in detail in the following chapters if they are relevant for clarifying the different evolution between both 
models. As can be seen in the following tables, some system actuation setpoints and some steady 
state conditions are different between the Reference Plant and Zion NPP models. 
 
The following Table 6.3 shows the main setpoints and features of the principal systems used at the 
Reference Plant and Zion models. 
 
PARAMETER 
Reference Plant 
MAAP5 model 
Zion MAAP5 model 
Low pressurizer trip point 1.3536E7 Pa 1.250E7 Pa 
Pressure setpoint for charging pumps Not modeled 1.262E7 Pa 
Pressure setpoint for HPI 1.285E7 Pa 1.172E7 Pa 
Pressure setpoint for LPI 1.285E7 Pa 1.276E6 Pa 
Pressure setpoint for containment sprays  0.16995E6 Pa 0.245E6 Pa 
Accumulator initial pressure 4.516E6 4.24E6 Pa 
Accumulator initial water mass 2.7564E4 kg 2.382E4 kg 
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PARAMETER 
Reference Plant 
MAAP5 model 
Zion MAAP5 model 
Opening pressure SG PORV 7.8093E6 Pa 7.24E6 Pa 
RWST initial water mass 1.44768E6 kg 1.316E6 kg 
Delay time for MFW isolation 3.0 s 0.0 s 
Delay time for AFW actuation 49.84 s 10.0 s 
Pressurizer PORV opening pressure 1.6209E7 Pa 
1.583E7 and 1.6148E7 
Pa 
CST initial water mass 0.6414E6 kg 1.0E6 kg 
Table 6.3 – Setpoints for The Reference Plant I-II and Zion MAAP5.0.1 models 
 
The following Table 6.4 shows the data obtained after simulating a steady state of 1000 seconds with 
the Reference Plant and Zion models. 
 
PARAMETER 
Reference Plant 
MAAP5.0.1 model 
Zion MAAP5.0.1 model 
Primary system pressure 1.5459E7 Pa 1.5732E7 Pa 
Secondary system pressure 6.4776E6 Pa 5.0669E6 Pa 
Hot leg temperature 598.91 K 599.92 K 
Cold leg temperature 561.54 K 562.88 K 
Pressurizer water level 6.628 m 8.527 m 
Steam generator wide range level 12.299 m 12.479 m 
Nuclear power 2940.60 MW 3565.00 MW 
Primary to secondary heat transfer 2954.19 MW 3577.01 MW 
RCP’s power (1 pump) 4.630 MW 3.175 MW 
Convective heat losses  1.795E6 W 2.000E6 W 
Primary water inventory (without pzr) 175829.11 kg 209453.14 kg 
Primary system mass flow (one loop) 4657.21 kg/s 4250.75 kg/s 
Steam mass flow (one SG) 546.45 kg/s 483.53 kg/s 
MFW water temperature 500.37 K 493.30 K 
Table 6.4 – Nominal conditions for The Reference Plant I-II and Zion MAAP5.0.1 models 
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6.2.2. Large Break LOCA 
Accident conditions 
The initiating event, a double-ended LOCA in the cold leg 1, is produced at time zero at nominal 
conditions. It’s postulated the unavailability of the four Fan Coolers and the recirculation mode failure 
after the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) depletion. The simulation is stopped after 20000 s. 
The following table summarizes the key timings for the Double-ended cold leg LOCA sequence, which 
were simulated with MAAP5.0.1 using the Reference Plant and Zion NPP models. 
 
MAAP5.0.1 PWR LBLOCA Figures-of-Merit 
 Reference Plant Model Zion Model 
Fraction of Clad Reacted in Vessel 0.25 0.23 
Time of Core Uncovery (s) 0.810 1.24 
Time of 1st Relocation to Lower Plenum (s) 8005 7887 
Time of Vessel Failure (s) 13829  
Due to creep rupture 
N/A 
Due to ex-vessel cooling 
Table 6.5 – Key timings for the sequence: Double-ended cold leg LOCA with failure of recirculation 
Accident Description 
The double-ended LOCA depressurizes the primary system in few seconds due to the large amount of 
water and gas discharged through the break (see Figure 6.83, Figure 6.84 and Figure 6.85). The 
reactor is automatically shutdown due to MCP trip, which is produced owing to low RCS mass flow. 
Then, accordingly to the MAAP control, the MFW system is stopped, the AFW system and the SI 
system are initiated increasing the vessel water level, and the MSIVs are closed. The pressurizer 
heaters are stopped due to low pressurizer water level and the core is uncovered. All these events took 
place in just one second. The loss of coolant increases the containment pressure so the Containment 
Sprays are initiated and ultimately, the accumulators are discharged just one minute after the break. 
The RWST has run dry in around 50 minutes due to the water consumption of the SI and the 
Containment Sprays. Since it’s postulated the failure of the recirculation mode, the LPI and the 
Containment Sprays are tripped after the RWST depletion (see Figure 6.86, Figure 6.87 and Figure 
6.88). In consequence, the natural circulation is stopped in loops 2 and 3; there wasn’t natural 
circulation in loop 1 where the break occurred; and hence, the core water temperature and the RCS 
void fraction are increased, abruptly after the core relocation into the lower plenum (see Figure 6.89, 
Figure 6.90, Figure 6.91 and Figure 6.92). The vessel water level is decreased due to the reduction of 
core water mass and consequently, the upper plenum gas temperature and the maximum core 
temperature increased (see Figure 6.93, Figure 6.94, Figure 6.95, Figure 6.96 and Figure 6.97). 
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The vessel’s downcomer can be blocked or unblocked for gas export depending on the vessel water 
level and this phenomena introduces higher oscillations in the RCS temperature, the vessel water level 
and the gas break mass flow just before the RCS is completely empty (see Figure 6.84, Figure 6.94 
and Figure 6.95).  
Due to the rapid depressurization of the primary system and the increase of RCS water temperature, 
the primary to secondary heat transfer is inverted. It means that the secondary system heated the 
primary system until the RCS temperature rose up due to the SI termination (see Figure 6.98).  
The AFW mass flow is higher in Zion than in The Reference Plant and hence, the SG water level is 
increased until its desired collapsed water level faster in Zion (see Figure 6.99 and Figure 6.100). 
However, the divergent secondary system pressure evolution between models is explained by the 
different features of the SG (see Figure 6.101). Although the primary to secondary heat transfer is 
negative and very similar between both models, the secondary pressure is increased in Zion due to the 
addition of water into the SG while in The Reference Plant, the AFW water is not enough to 
compensate the energy lost and increase the secondary pressure. 
The containment pressure is increased due to the large amount of mass and energy released into the 
containment building almost instantly after the break. The Containment Sprays are capable to reduce 
the containment pressure until the RWST is depleted. Then, the containment pressure is increased 
again, changing abruptly just after the relocation of core material to the lower head (see Figure 6.102).   
The different reactor cavity compartment size and the different orientation and area of the junctions that 
connect the reactor cavity with other compartments explain why the vessel failure took place in the 
Reference Plant while it didn’t occur in Zion. Zion’s Cavity size and the disposition of its junctions have 
allowed flooding the reactor Cavity and hence, the reactor vessel external cooling (see Table 6.1 and 
Table 6.2). 
The water mass accumulated in the Cavity compartment is higher in Zion than in The Reference Plant 
and the vessel water level in Zion is above the vessel height so the vessel didn’t fail (see Figure 6.103 
and Figure 6.104). The vessel failure and the consequent corium ejection into the reactor Cavity made 
increase the containment pressure in the Reference Plant due to the faster vaporization of the water 
accumulated in the reactor Cavity (see Figure 6.102, Figure 6.103, Figure 6.105 and Figure 6.106). 
By looking at the trends of the sequence, comparing the timing of the key events summarized in the 
figures-of-merit in the Table 6.5 and the primary system and containment conditions shown in the 
plottable results, and analyzing the system actuations as indicated by events in the summary files it’s 
possible to affirm that the Reference Plant model is responding as expected when simulating a Double-
ended LOCA.  
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Figure 6.83: Double-ended LOCA – Primary pressure 
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Figure 6.84: Double-ended LOCA – Gas break flow through loop 1 
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Figure 6.85: Double-ended LOCA – Water break flow through loop 1 
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Figure 6.86: Double-ended LOCA – RWST water level 
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Figure 6.87: Double-ended LOCA – Safety injection mass flow rate 
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Figure 6.88: Double-ended LOCA – Containment spray mass flow rate 
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Figure 6.89: Double-ended LOCA – Average flow in cold leg loop 1 
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Figure 6.90: Double-ended LOCA – Average flow in cold leg loop 2 
Page 100  Report 
 
CNA5 vs ZION5: LBLOCA
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Time (s)
R
C
S 
vo
id
 fr
ac
tio
n 
VFPS
---- CNA
---- ZION
 
Figure 6.91: Double-ended LOCA – RCS void fraction 
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Figure 6.92: Double-ended LOCA – Core water temperature 
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Figure 6.93: Double-ended LOCA – Core water mass 
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Figure 6.94: Double-ended LOCA – Vessel water level 
Page 102  Report 
 
CNA5 vs ZION5: LBLOCA
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Time (s)
U
pp
er
 p
le
nu
m
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 (K
)
TGRCS(14)
---- CNA
---- ZION
 
Figure 6.95: Double-ended LOCA – Upper plenum hot leg temperature 
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Figure 6.96: Double-ended LOCA – Maximum core temperature 
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Figure 6.97: Double-ended LOCA – Total mass of core remaining in core 
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Figure 6.98: Double-ended LOCA – Primary to secondary heat transfer 
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Figure 6.99: Double-ended LOCA – AFW mass flow to steam generator 1 
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Figure 6.100: Double-ended LOCA – Steam generator 1 water level 
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Figure 6.101: Double-ended LOCA – Steam generator 1 pressure  
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Figure 6.102: Double-ended LOCA – Cavity compartment pressure 
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Figure 6.103: Double-ended LOCA – Water mass in the Cavity compartment 
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Figure 6.104: Double-ended LOCA – Water level in the Cavity compartment 
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CNA5 vs ZION5: LBLOCA
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Figure 6.105: Double-ended LOCA – Corium mass in the Cavity compartment 
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Figure 6.106: Double-ended LOCA – Steam mass in Cavity compartment 
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6.2.3. Small Break LOCA 
Accident conditions 
 
The initiating event, a 2” break at the cold leg, is produced at time zero at nominal conditions. It’s 
postulated the recirculation mode failure after the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) depletion. 
The simulation is stopped after 60000 seconds. 
 
The following table summarizes the key timings for the 2” break at the cold leg LOCA sequence, 
which were simulated with MAAP5.0.1 for the Reference Plant and Zion NPP models. 
 
MAAP5.0.1 PWR SBLOCA Figures-of-Merit 
 Reference Plant Model Zion Model 
Fraction of Clad Reacted in Vessel 0.39 0.45 
Time of Core Uncovery (s) 8043 9169 
Time of Hot Leg Creep Rupture (s) -- 21534 
Time of 1st Relocation to Lower Plenum (s) 27223 15384 
Time of Vessel Failure (s) 33096 
Due to creep rupture 
N/A 
Due to ex-vessel cooling 
Table 6.6 – Key timings for the sequence: 2” break at cold leg with failure of recirculation 
Accident Description 
The 2” break LOCA depressurizes the primary system in few seconds and the reactor is automatically 
shutdown due to low primary system pressure (see Figure 6.107, Figure 6.109 and Figure 6.110). 
Then, accordingly to the MAAP control, the MFW system is stopped, the AFW system and the Safety 
Injection System are initiated and the MSIVs are closed (see Figure 6.117). The main coolant pumps 
are tripped due to high vibration and the pressurizer heaters are stopped due to low pressurizer water 
level. The loss of coolant increases the containment pressure and the Fan Coolers are activated. All 
these actions are produced in just over one minute. 
The upper containment sprays are initiated 980 seconds after the LOCA and it accelerates the RWST 
depletion (see Figure 6.118). Since it’s postulated the recirculation mode failure, the core water mass is 
reduced, the upper plenum gas temperature started to increase and the core is uncovered around 
1000 seconds after the RWST emptying, at time 8043 seconds for the Reference Plant and at time 
9169 seconds for Zion NPP (see Figure 6.108 and Figure 6.112).  
The accumulators are injected 1550 seconds after the RWST depletion, once the RCS pressure is 
below the accumulator’s pressure. Then the RCS void fraction is increased and the primary system 
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pressure diminishes due to the LOCA mass flow and the absence of water injection into the primary 
circuit (see Figure 6.111).  
In contradiction to The Reference Plant, in Zion the higher pressure and temperatures of the RCS 
produced the hot leg creep rupture and in consequence, the RCS pressure and temperature were 
suddenly reduced allowing the water of the accumulators to be injected quickly and increase the vessel 
water level for few seconds. The second reduction of the upper plenum gas temperature is due to the 
unblocking of the loop seals 1 and 2 which permitted the gas to flow and cool the core (see Figure 
6.108 and Figure 6.114).  
However, in The Reference Plant, the in-core instrument tube failure reduced the RCS pressure and 
the hot leg rupture didn’t take place. The failure was closed one hour later when the relocation of core 
materials to the lower head was initiated an consequently, the RCS pressure and water temperature 
augmented, increasing the gas break mass flow and the primary to secondary heat transfer, until the 
vessel failed by creep (see Figure 6.115 and Figure 6.116).   
As in the previous scenario, the different reactor cavity compartment size and the different orientation 
and area of the junctions that connect the reactor cavity with other compartments explain why the 
vessel failure took place in The Reference Plant while it didn’t occur in Zion. Zion’s Cavity size and the 
disposition of its junctions have allowed flooding the reactor Cavity and hence, the reactor vessel 
external cooling (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). 
The water mass accumulated in the Cavity compartment is higher in Zion than in The Reference Plant 
and the vessel water level in Zion is above the vessel height, so the vessel didn’t fail (see Figure 6.125 
and Figure 6.126). The vessel failure and the consequent corium ejection into the reactor Cavity made 
increase the containment pressure in the The Reference Plant due to the faster vaporization of the 
water accumulated in the reactor Cavity (see Figure 6.124, Figure 6.127 and Figure 6.128). 
The AFW mass flow is higher in Zion than in The Reference Plant and hence, the SG water level is 
increased until its desired collapsed water level faster in Zion (see Figure 6.122 and Figure 6.123). The 
steam generator PORV opening setpoints are different between both plants and the secondary 
pressure remains higher in The Reference Plant until it started to decrease due to the AFW water 
injection.  
Once the water level got the desired water level, the AFW was stopped and the pressure started to 
increase. In The Reference Plant the evolution of the SG 1 differs from the evolutions of the SG 2 and 
SG 3, which are similar to each other. The asymmetry of the natural circulation flow and in 
consequence, the different energy balance in each steam generator, explain the divergent secondary 
pressures between plants. The pressure increment produced before the vessel failure is provoked by 
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the pressure and temperature increase of the RCS after the in-core instrument tube plugging. In Zion, 
the SG with different behavior is the number 3 (see Figure 6.119, Figure 6.120 and Figure 6.121). 
The containment pressure is increased due to the large amount of mass and energy released into the 
containment building almost instantly after the break. The Containment Sprays are capable to reduce 
the containment pressure until the RWST is depleted, to a greater extent in The Reference Plant than 
in Zion due to the higher the Reference Plant’s sprays mass flow. At this point, the water accumulated 
in the Refueling Cavity in Zion (Compartment number 5) is completely evaporated, increasing the 
containment pressure faster than in the Reference Plant.  
The abrupt changes in the Reference Plant’s containment pressure are produced by the energy and 
mass realized after the in-core instrument tube failure, the vessel rupture, and the evaporation of the 
water accumulated in the Cavity compartment. In Zion, the pressure peaks are due to the mass and 
energy released to the containment after the hot leg creep rupture and the unblocking of the loop seals 
(see Figure 6.124).  
By looking at the trends of the sequence, comparing the timing of the key events summarized in the 
figures-of-merit in the Table 6.6 and the primary system and containment conditions shown in the 
plottable results, and analyzing the system actuations as indicated by events in the summary files is 
possible to affirm that the Reference Plant I-II NPP model is responding as expected when simulating a 
2” small LOCA.  
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Figure 6.107: 2” Break LOCA – Primary Pressure 
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Figure 6.108: 2” Break LOCA – Upper plenum gas temperature 
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Figure 6.109: 2” Break LOCA – Water break mass flow 
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Figure 6.110: 2” Break LOCA – Gas break mass flow 
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Figure 6.111: 2” Break LOCA – RCS void fraction 
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Figure 6.112: 2” Break LOCA – Core water mass 
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Figure 6.113: 2” Break LOCA – Core water temperature 
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Figure 6.114: 2” Break LOCA – Vessel water level 
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Figure 6.115: 2” Break LOCA – Mass of core material remaining in core 
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Figure 6.116: 2” Break LOCA – Maximum core temperature 
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Figure 6.117: 2” Break LOCA – Safety injection mass flow 
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Figure 6.118: 2” Break LOCA – Containment sprays mass flow 
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CNA5 vs ZION5: SBLOCA
0.0E+00
1.0E+06
2.0E+06
3.0E+06
4.0E+06
5.0E+06
6.0E+06
7.0E+06
8.0E+06
9.0E+06
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Time (s)
St
ea
m
 g
en
er
at
or
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
1 
 (P
a)
PSGGEN(1)
---- CNA
---- ZION
 
Figure 6.119: 2” Break LOCA – Steam generator 1 pressure 
 
CNA5 vs ZION5: SBLOCA
0.0E+00
1.0E+06
2.0E+06
3.0E+06
4.0E+06
5.0E+06
6.0E+06
7.0E+06
8.0E+06
9.0E+06
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Time (s)
St
ea
m
 g
en
er
at
or
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
2 
(P
a)
PSGGEN(2)
---- CNA
---- ZION
 
Figure 6.120: 2” Break LOCA – Steam generator 2 pressure 
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Figure 6.121: 2” Break LOCA – Steam generator 3 pressure 
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Figure 6.122: 2” Break LOCA – Steam generator 1 water level 
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Figure 6.123: 2” Break LOCA – AFW mass flow of SG 1 
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Figure 6.124: 2” Break LOCA – Cavity compartment pressure 
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Figure 6.125: 2” Break LOCA – Water mass in Cavity compartment 
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Figure 6.126: 2” Break LOCA – Water level in Cavity compartment 
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Figure 6.127: 2” Break LOCA – Steam mass in Cavity compartment 
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Figure 6.128: 2” Break LOCA – Steam mass in Upper compartment 
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6.2.4. Station Blackout 
Accident conditions 
The initiating event, a station blackout, is produced at time zero at nominal conditions. It’s assumed the 
unavailability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the steam generator relief valves. It’s postulated 
the loss of coolant through the MCP seals 2700 seconds after the loss of AC power. The simulation is 
terminated after 40 hours. 
 
The following table summarizes the key timings for the Station blackout sequence, which was 
simulated with both MAAP5.0.1 for the Reference Plant and Zion NPP models. 
 
MAAP5.0.1 PWR Station Blackout Figures-of-Merit 
 Reference Plant Model Zion Model 
Fraction of Clad Reacted in Vessel 0.32 0.50 
Time of Core Uncovery 5884 7464 
Time of Hot Leg Creep Rupture 10076 10835 
Time of 1st Relocation to Lower Plenum 12763 16116 
Time of Vessel Failure 19205 23314 
Time of Containment Failure --- 123229 
Table 6.7 – Key timings for the sequence: 2” break at cold leg with failure of recirculation 
Accident Description 
Due to the loss of AC power, the control rods are de-energized and the reactor is automatically shut 
down. The loss of both, the essential and nonessential electrical buses, produces the main coolant 
pumps trip and the unavailability of the AFW motor-driven pumps, the HPI and LPI systems. Since it’s 
postulated the unavailability of the turbine-driven pump, the steam generators are emptied in less than 
one hour. The secondary pressure is increased until the SG’s safety valves are opened.  
It’s lost the RCS pressure control capability since the pressurizer’s sprays and the heaters are off. In 
consequence, during the first hour of the accident the RCS pressure is increased until the pressurizer’s 
PORV valves are opened (see Figure 6.129). It’s postulated the loss of coolant through the MCP seals 
2700 seconds after the loss of AC power, with an area of 4·10-5 m2 per loop, and because there is no 
safety injection, the RCS void fraction is increased and the natural circulation of the primary system is 
stopped (see Figure 6.131, Figure 6.132, Figure 6.133 and Figure 6.134). The water and break mass 
flows are similar for both plants but the primary circuit volume is greater in Zion therefore, the core 
uncover is produced earlier in the Reference Plant. 
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The seal LOCA depressurizes immediately the primary circuit in the Zion NPP model while it doesn’t 
happen in the Reference Plant model. Actually, the RCS pressure reduction in the Reference Plant 
started at 8200 seconds due to an in-core instrument tube failure. This kind of failure can only transport 
gas and fission products and it was plugged 1600 seconds later.  
Few seconds after the plugging, the hot leg failed by creep rupture and the primary circuit is 
immediately depressurized until the Containment pressure. The accumulators are discharged and the 
water is introduced into the vessel, increasing the vessel water level and reducing drastically the core 
water temperature. After the accumulators’ injection and the relocation of core materials into the lower 
head, the loop seals remained unblocked for gas export in Zion NPP while they remained blocked in 
the Reference Plant (see Figure 6.135, Figure 6.136, Figure 6.137 and Figure 6.138).   
The upper plenum gas temperature is increased after the core uncovering and it is drastically reduced 
after the hot leg creep rupture. Until the vessel failure, this temperature is oscillating due to the blocking 
and unblocking for the gas export of the loop seals and the downcomer of the vessel. After the lower 
head rupture, the temperature is decreasing until the Containment is failed (see Figure 6.130).  
The maximum core temperature is increased after the core uncover and the whole core is melted and 
discharged into the Cavity compartment once the vessel has failed due to creep rupture in the 
Reference Plant and due to the ejection of one penetration tube in Zion NPP (see Figure 6.139 and 
Figure 6.140). 
The steam generator water inventory is evaporated in less than one hour and the secondary pressure 
augmented after the scram until the safety valve were opened. After the hot leg rupture, the SG 
pressure suddenly decreased and from this point, the behavior of the steam generator differs between 
both models due to different evolution of the Containment pressure and hence, due to the different heat 
transfer rate from the SG to the Containment between models (see Figure 6.141 and Figure 6.142).  
By looking at the trends of the sequence, comparing the timing of the key events summarized in the 
figures-of-merit in the Table 6.7 and the primary system and containment conditions shown in the 
plottable results, and analyzing the system actuations as indicated by events in the summary files is 
possible to affirm that the Reference Plant model is responding as expected when simulating an 
Station Blackout with pump seal LOCA. 
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Figure 6.129: Station Blackout – Primary Pressure 
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Figure 6.130: Station Blackout – Upper plenum gas temperature 
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Figure 6.131: Station Blackout – Water break mass flow 
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Figure 6.132: Station Blackout – Gas break mass flow 
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Figure 6.133: Station Blackout – RCS void fraction 
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Figure 6.134: Station Blackout – Average flow in hot leg loop 1 
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Figure 6.135: Station Blackout – Accumulators water mass 
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Figure 6.136: Station Blackout – Core water mass 
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Figure 6.137: Station Blackout – Core water temperature 
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Figure 6.138: Station Blackout – Vessel water level 
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Figure 6.139: Station Blackout – Total mass of core remaining in core 
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Figure 6.140: Station Blackout – Maximum core temperature 
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CNA5 vs ZION5: TMLB
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Figure 6.141: Station Blackout – Pressure of steam generator 1 
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Figure 6.142: Station Blackout – Water level of steam generator 1 
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CNA5 vs ZION5: TMLB
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Figure 6.143: Station Blackout – Cavity compartment pressure 
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Figure 6.144: Station Blackout – Water mass in Cavity compartment 
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Figure 6.145: Station Blackout – Corium mass in Cavity compartment 
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Figure 6.146: Station Blackout – Water mass in Annular compartment 
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6.2.5. Conclusions of Reference Plant vs Zion comparison 
 
It has been compared several scenarios simulated with MAAP5.0.1 using the Reference Plant model 
and the Zion5 model with the aim of testing the migrated Parameter File. It has been studied the 
evolution of a Double-ended Break LOCA, a 2” Small LOCA and a Station Blackout. 
The Reference Plant has 3 loops while Zion is a four-loop plant.  It means that the thermal power, the 
water mass and the volume of the primary system are quite different between both plants. Furthermore, 
most of the setpoints that actuates the main systems are slightly different as detailed in Table 6.3. 
Therefore, the objective of the comparison has been limited to analyze and delimit the major 
discrepancies found in each scenario. It has been verified that the general trends of the sequences are 
as expected and the discrepancies are explained by the different features of these plants. 
In that way, one significant difference is the reactor cavity compartment size and the orientation and 
area of the junctions that connect this compartment with the other ones. Zion’s cavity is smaller than 
the Reference Plant’s cavity and the disposition of its junctions may flood the reactor cavity and cool 
externally the reactor vessel. This phenomenon is not possible in the Reference Plant and in 
consequence, the vessel failed in the LOCA cases while it didn’t fail using the Zion’s model.  
The system actuations as indicated by events in the summary files, the timing of the key events 
summarized in the figures-of-merit and the primary system and the containment conditions shown in 
the plottable results are responding as expected when simulating these standard sequences.  
 
Summarizing, it has been met the recommendations of the MAAP4 Applications Guidance testing all 
major models and confronted those models with a variety of anticipated boundary conditions. In this 
way, the updated Reference Plant model has been validated.  
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7. Conclusions 
It has been explained the severe accident phenomenology and the MAAP code used for the study of 
beyond design bases accidents. 
It has been updated and tested the new parameter file for the PWR Reference Plant. First of all, it has 
been checked the steady state consistency and then, it has been compared the results obtained with 
the MAAP5.0.1 Reference Plant model with the results obtained with the RELAP5 model.  
The comparative analysis between MAAP5.0.1 and RELAP5 Mod3.2 calculations has showed the 
limitations of the Reference Plant MAAP5 model to simulate some accidents of the level 1 Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment. However, it allowed testing the Reference NPP MAAP5.0.1 model in front of the 
thermal-hydraulic phase of severe accidents and justifying its behavior in front of different initiating 
events.  
 
It has been compared several scenarios simulated with MAAP5.0.1 using the Reference Plant model 
and the Zion5 model with the aim of validating the updated Parameter File. It has been studied the 
evolution of a Double-ended Break LOCA, a 2” Small LOCA and a Station Blackout. 
By looking at the trends of these sequences, comparing the timing of the key events summarized in the 
figures-of-merit and the primary system and containment conditions shown in the plottable results, and 
analyzing the system actuations as indicated by events in the summary files is possible to affirm that 
the Reference Plant model is responding as expected when simulating these standard sequences. 
Summarizing, it has been met the recommendations of the MAAP4 Applications Guidance testing all 
major models and confronted those models with a variety of anticipated boundary conditions. In this 
way, the updated Reference Plant model has been validated.  
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